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THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF TITLE UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
WILLIAM L. TABAC*
INTRODUCTION
In the mind's eye, "title" to property conjures up sweeping vi-
sions of ownership.' So it did in the minds of the common-law
judges. Generations of law students envisioned it as the fabled
stockpile whose holder could sell the entire bundle outright or part
with each twig piecemeal, happily, say, to a lessee, or woefully, to a
judgment lien creditor.
Title was also the polestar that guided the development of
property law into the twentieth century. Today, however, it is
dimmed in the legal if not in the lay consciousness. While it contin-
ues to flourish in real property law, the rules governing personal
property have taken quite a different turn. Under the Uniform
Commercial Code,2 which regulates bargained-for interests in per-
sonal property, the focus has shifted from title to contract and its
ideas of mutual assent.3
The Code's drafters expressly rejected title theory for transac-
tions in goods.4 They felt the concept was analogous to scattershot
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. B.A., Case Western Reserve Uni-
versity, 1962; J.D., George Washington University, 1966. I would like to thank the
Cleveland-Marshall Fund Committee for the summer research grant that enabled me to
prepare this article.
1. Ownership is "a collection of rights to use and enjoy property, including the
right to sell . . . it. The jus disponendi (right of alienation) is an essential element of
property." 63 AM. JUR. 2D Property § 30 (1964). "[T]he right of possession depends on
ownership .... Rick v. Boegel, 205 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Iowa 1973). "In the legal sense
... property means not the thing itself, but the rights which inhere in it. Ownership, or
the right of property is, moreover, not a single indivisible concept but a collection or
bundle of rights, of legally protected interests." R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 5, at 6 (2d ed. 1955).
2. All references to the U.C.C. are to the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1989 OFFI-
CIAL TEXT AND COMMENTS (West 1 th ed. 1990), unless otherwise indicated.
3. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
4. See U.C.C. § 2-401 ("Each provision of this Article with respect to the rights,
obligations and remedies of the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties ap-
plies irrespective of title to the goods except where the provision refers to such title.");
§ 9-202 ("Each provision of this Article with regard to rights, obligations and remedies
applies whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor."). See also
Evans Prods. Co. v.Jorgensen, 245 Or. 362, 365, 421 P.2d 978, 980 (1966) ("Under the
UCC, title is not the talisman."); U.C.C. § 2A-302 (Proposed Final Draft).
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from a blunderbuss. To Karl Llewellyn, the legal realist who both
stumped for the Code's adoption and played a key role in its draft-
ing, title was both too theoretical and too static a concept to be effi-
cient. 5 He reasoned that its all-or-nothing approach lacked
precision.6 The drafters proclaimed that under the new Code, con-
sequences in the marketplace would be determined pragmatically.'
The transaction would be ruled as the parties shaped it by their con-
tract, consistent with their expectations, yet sensitive to those of
third parties.
As nearly a half century's experience with the Code has shown,
5. See Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. 159, 165-
69 (1938).
To a silly issue no sane answer is possible. This one we currently pose
thus: Has title passed? and solve by locating a mythical-or should I say more
accurately 'mystical'?-essence known as title, which is hung over the buyer's
head or the seller's like a halo. Halos are, it appears, indivisible. And there is
only one halo for buyer and seller to make out with.
Id.
6. See id. at 169.
The approach of prevailing sales doctrine, before or apart from the [Uni-
form Sales] Act and in it, is this: Unless a cogent reason be shown to the con-
trary, the location of title will govern every point which it can be made to
govern. It will govern, between the parties, risk, action for the price, the appli-
cable law in an interstate transaction, the place and time for measuring dam-
ages, the power to defeat the other party's interest, or to replevy, or to reject; it
will govern, as against outsiders, leviability, rights against tort-feasors, infrac-
tion of criminal statutes about sales, incidence of taxation, power to insure.
The burden is put upon any individual issue to show why it should be honored
by being severed from the Title-lump in any particular, and given individual-
ized treatment. Now this would be an admirable way to go at it if the Title
concept (or other basic integrated concept used) had been tailored to fit the
normal course of a going or suspended situation during its flux or suspension. But Title
was not thus conceived, nor has its environment of buyers and sellers had mate-
rial effect upon it. It remains, in the sales field, an alien lump, undigested. It
even interferes with the digestive process.
lId (emphasis in original).
7. The official comment to § 2-401 provides: "This Article deals with the issues
between seller and buyer in terms of step by step performance or non-performance
under the contract of sale and not in terms of whether or not 'title' to the goods has
passed." U.C.C. § 2-401 official comment 1. The official comment to § 9-101 provides:
The aim of this Article is to provide a simple and unified structure within
which the immense variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go
forward with less cost and with greater certainty.
This Article does not determine whether 'title' to collateral is in the se-
cured party or in the debtor and adopts neither a 'title theory' nor a 'lien the-
ory' of security interests. Rights, obligations and remedies under the Article do
not depend on the location of title (Section 9-202).
U.C.C. § 9-101 official comment. But compare this to article 2A, the most recent Code
article, which does not contain such a disclaimer.
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however, that goal has been frustrated. Courts predictably relied on
the drafters' injunctions against using title as a philosopher's stone
in resolving Code conflicts.' But the upshot has been considerable
uncertainty about how the various Code articles that regulate trans-
actions in goods relate to each other. With the introduction of the
new lease article, article 2A, the confusion will increase.
Perhaps the drafters did "protesteth" a bit too much about tide.
For, despite their disclaimers, ownership principles were apparently
very much in their hearts, if not in their eyes, when they wrote the
Code. In fact, the centerpiece of article 2 is title. The "sale"-dy-
namically the transfer of title and also the concept after which article
2 is named-is the article's primary focus. Article 9, which regulates
security interests, deals with a mere fragment of ownership. Yet, the
current Code thinkers tend to treat ownership and security interests
as fungible Code claims.
This Article will offer the heresy that the transactions in goods
that the Code regulates are still firmly grounded on ownership prin-
ciples and that these principles must be reckoned with to fulfill the
Code's design. It is therefore important first to identify the various
property interests in goods that one can obtain under the Code and
determine how the Code ties these interests to title.
I. TITLE, SECURITY, AND LEASEHOLD INTERESTS IN GOODS
In exploiting goods, an owner may barter away rights that
range from naked possession to complete control of the property.
Along with outright sales, the Code covers a wide array of bar-
gained-for interests in goods.
Article 2 of the Code regulates sales of goods.9 At its core is
title. A "sale" under article 2 is the transfer of "title" to goods from
a "seller" to a "buyer" in exchange for a price.' ° "Title" under the
Code means ownership."' Article 2 simply governs the transfer of
8. See, e.g., Wilson v. Gear, 110 Ill. App. 3d 538, 442 N.E.2d 670 (1982) (antiquated
concepts of"title" do not control); Hayward v. Postma, 31 Mich. App. 720, 188 N.W.2d
31 (1971); Hughes v. Al Green, Inc., 65 Ohio St. 2d 110,418 N.E.2d 1355 (1981); Evans
Prods. Co. v. Jorgensen, 245 Or. 362, 365, 421 P.2d 978, 980 (1966).
9. See U.C.C. § 2-101. "This Article shall be known . . .as Uniform Commercial
Code-Sales." See also id. § 1-109. Although § 2-102 provides that article 2 "applies to
transactions in goods," its particular provisions focus on sales. See, e.g., id. § 2-106 (lim-
its "contract" and "agreement" to sales).
10. See id. § 2-106(1).
11. The goods articles are replete with references to title and ownership. In article
2, see id. §§ 2-106, 2-312, 2-327(l)(a), 2-401, 2-403(1), 2-722(a) (title); §§ 2-602(2)(a),
2-606(1)(c) (ownership). In article 2A, see id. §§ 2A-302, 2A-304(1), 2A-309(4), (5), (7),
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ownership of goods in sales transactions.
Article 2A regulates "leasehold" interests in goods.1 2 One of
these interests is the possession and use for a specified term that a
"lessee"'13 acquires under a "lease."' 4  The other interest is the
"lessor's" title to the goods.' 5 When a lease terminates, the lessor
reacquires from the lessee whatever remains of the property.'
6
In the article 9 secured transaction, the "debtor"' 7 either has
ownership rights in the goods or has the right to use the goods as
collateral.' The remaining Code property interest in the goods is
the "security interest."1 9 The security interest is held by the "se-
cured party" 2° who will have even fewer rights to the goods than a
lessee. Although the secured party may have the right to possess
the goods, normally there is no accompanying right to use them.2'
In fact, the secured party's right to exploit the goods in any respect
will be contingent upon a breach of the "security agreement" by the
(8) (owner). In article 9, see id. §§ 9-102(2), 9-202 (title); §§ 9-105(l)(d), 9-112, 9-
314(4) (owner).
The Code uses "tide" and "property" interchangeably. See, e.g, id. § 2-401(1). The
English, however, distinguish between them. Under the English Sale of Goods Act,
1979, ch. 54, "property" means the totality of a seller's rights over an object. "Title"
denotes absoluteness. See Fridman, Should Commonwealth Countries Adopt Article 2 of The
Uniform Commercial Code? An English View in ASPECTS OF COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW
18, 21 (J. Ziegel & W. Foster eds. 1969).
12. See U.C.C. § 2A-102 ("This Article applies to any transaction, regardless of form,
that creates a lease.").
13. See id. § 2A-103(l)(n).
14. See id. § 2A-103(l)(j).
15. See id. § 2A-103(l)(p).
16. The remainder is the "residual interest." See id. § 2A-103(l)(q).
17. See id. § 9-105(l)(d).
18. Article 9 debtors may both "own" and have "rights" in the collateral. See id.
Where collateral is not owned by the debtor, the owner must authorize the debtor's use
of the goods as collateral. See Towe Farms Inc. v. Central Iowa Prod. Credit Ass'n, 528
F. Supp. 500, 505 (S.D. Iowa 1981). In such cases, the owner of the goods will also be a
"debtor" and the secured party will be required to inform the owner of any actions that
will affect the goods. See U.C.C. § 9-112.
19. U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
20. See id. § 9-105(m).
21. The secured party takes possession of the goods pending the performance of the
security agreement. See id. § 9-203. When goods are not pledged as security, the se-
cured party's right to possess them is contingent upon the debtor's default. See id. §H 9-
501, 9-503, 9-504. In either case, while the goods are in the secured party's possession,
the secured party must use reasonable care to protect the goods. Id. § 9-207(1). This
duty, moreover, may not be disclaimed. See id. § 1-102(3). If, both before and after
default, the secured party fails to protect the debtor's ownership interest in the goods,
the secured party may be liable to the debtor for conversion. See id. §§ 9-207(3), 9-
507(1); Towe Farms, 528 F. Supp. at 506-07. See also R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 10-7 (2d ed. 1979).
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debtor.
Under the Code, the secured party's and lessee's interests are a
far cry from ownership. These limited Code claims are based in-
stead on the strength of the lessor's or debtor's rights to the
goods. 3 Because of this, they are said to be "derivative" claims that
can rise no higher than whatever rights the lessor or debtor has in
the goods.24
The following is a review of the various rights to goods that
arise in an article 2 sale.
II. CODE PROPERTY INTERESTS IN CONTEXT: AN ARTICLE 2
TRANSFER OF TITLE AND ITS EFFECTS ON SECURITY
INTERESTS AND LEASES
As aspects of title, the derivative Code interests in goods will
often change with the title. The following example illustrates the
movement of title under an article 2 sale of inventory25 and the ef-
fect of that movement on lease and security interests under articles
2A and 9.
ABC Corporation is a manufacturer of furniture. First Bank is
ABC Corporation's secured lender, a "floorplanner '2 6 under an ar-
22. See U.C.C. §§ 9-503, 9-504.
23. See id. §§ 9-203(l)(c), 2A-103(l)(j). Section 9-202 appears to suggest to the con-
trary for security interests. It provides that "each provision of this article with regard to
rights, obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the secured party
or in the debtor." According to the official comment, however, the reference to the
secured party's "tide" is to prior law under which mortgagees took title to collateral. See
id. § 9-202 official comment.
24. "[Derivative rights] limit a person's ability to transfer or encumber property to
the interest which the person possesses." Comment, UCC: Article 2A-Leases: Structuring
Priorities of Claimants to Leased Property, 73 MINN. L. REV. 208, 218 (1988). The "nemo dat
[quod non habet principle] pervades the Code." It underlies the "first in time, first in
right" rule, which means that "the person who takes rights second in time can take only
those rights that remain after the first taker has taken his rights." Harris, The Rights of
Creditors underArticle 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 803, 807-08 (1988). The debtor may, however,
have a "power" to convey rights. Id. at 808 n.14.
25. See U.C.C. § 9-109(4), which provides that "[g]oods are 'inventory' if they are
held by a person who holds them for sale or lease or to be furnished under contracts for
service or if he has so furnished them, or if they are raw materials, work in process or
materials used or consumed in a business." Id.
26. The term customarily refers to financing a dealer purchase of automobiles, see J.
HONNOLD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES AND SALES FINANCING 490 (5th
ed. 1984), but it generally refers to any financing of inventory under an after-acquired
property clause. See B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 10.5[3], at 10-35 to -36 (1980).
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ticle 9 security agreement. Under this written agreement, 7 First
Bank advances ABC Corporation money in order to purchase inven-
tory, and ABC Corporation will use this inventory as collateral for
the loan. As is customary under such agreements, First Bank will
take a security interest in "all equipment 28 and inventory owned2 9
or hereafter acquired" ° by ABC Corporation.
Because security agreements tend to be complex, ABC Corpo-
ration and First Bank will be represented by counsel during their
negotiations.3 1 The security agreement may or may not provide for
future advances by the bank,3 2 but it will undoubtedly impose upon
ABC Corporation obligations to insure and protect the collateral or
proceeds generated by the collateral.3 3 It will also specify the events
constituting "default" 4 and First Bank's rights to exploit the collat-
27. In nonpledge secured transactions, the debtor must sign a security agreement
that describes the collateral. See U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(a).
28. "Goods are 'equipment' if they are used or bought for use primarily in business
(including farming) or a profession or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or a
governmental subdivision or agency." Id. § 9-109(2).
29. Accountants use ownership to measure inventory claims. See 4 AICPA, CCH
PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 9005.10.
30. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) provides that the security agreement may contain an "after-
acquired" property clause, popularly known as a "floating lien" because it "floats over
both existing and after-acquired property of the debtor." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-6, at 1095 (3d ed. 1988). The clause can be far-reaching.
"It is possible for a term loan to be secured by whatever assets may happen to be lying
around at the time of default... " G. GILMORE, 1 SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 11.7, at 359 (1965). In describing the after-acquired property clause, the
leading Code commentators find ownership principles useful. It "'floats' over all of
[the] debtor's present and future assets." Id. "Such a clause extends the creditor's se-
curity interest to property acquired after an initial loan as well as to property then
owned by the debtor." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra, at 1095. Indeed, the secured
party is likely to bargain for a warranty that the debtor "owns" the after-acquired collat-
eral. R. HENSON, supra note 21, at 351.
31. "This comprehensive contract between the parties includes language evidencing
not only the bank's continuing security interest ... but also authorizing the bank to sign
notes and security agreements necessary to perfect it." J. HONNOLD, supra note 26, at
493.
32. See U.C.C. § 9-204(3).
33. " 'Proceeds' includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or
other disposition of the collateral or proceeds." Id. § 9-306(1). A secured party's claim
to proceeds is, unless otherwise agreed, automatic. It need not be spelled out in the
security agreement. See id. § 9-203(3).
34. Default is not defined under article 9. It is "whatever the security agreement says
it is." G. GILMORE, supra note 30, at 1193. Defining default is left "to the parties and to
any scraps of common law lying around" as well as "the modest limitations imposed by
the unconscionability doctrine and the requirement of good faith." J. WHrE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 30, at 1084. "The primary event of default will be a failure to make
required payments to the secured party in accordance with the schedule agreed upon."
R. HENSON, supra note 21, at 350. "Beyond this point, the events of default vary depend-
1991]
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eral if such events occur.
XYZ Corporation is a major retail outlet in the business of sell-
ing and leasing furniture to its customers. Second Bank, its floor-
planner under another comprehensive article 9 secured transaction,
also specifies as collateral for its loan "inventory and equipment
now owned and hereafter acquired" by XYZ Corporation.
XYZ Corporation wants to buy inventory from ABC Corpora-
tion. XYZ Corporation may use cash furnished by Second Bank to
purchase the inventory, or ABC Corporation may extend open
credit to XYZ Corporation. In either case, the informal sales con-
tract will be quite different than the detailed security agreement pre-
viously described.
The following scenario is a familiar one to merchants. On Mon-
day, XYZ Corporation mails ABC Corporation one of its form
purchase orders for a dozen lamps. On Thursday, ABC Corpora-
tion receives XYZ Corporation's purchase order and responds by
packaging the lamps, inserting its form invoice, and hauling the
lamps to a common carrier for delivery to XYZ Corporation. Upon
receipt of the lamps, XYZ Corporation pays for them with its per-
sonal check.
Unlike the security agreement, the essential terms did not come
from the writings of ABC Corporation and XYZ Corporation. No
written sales agreement was ever executed. 35 Still, a binding con-
tract of sale was formed under article 2 when ABC Corporation
shipped the lamps in response to XYZ Corporation's order.3 6 If any
essential terms were left unspecified, article 2's gap-filler provisions
supplied them.3 7 If written terms conflicted, section 2-207 resolved
ing on the kind of collateral, whether the transaction is purchase money or not, the
debtor's business (if the debtor is not a consumer) and so on." Id.
35. The security agreement must satisfy more demanding statutes of frauds require-
ments than the sales agreement. In the absence of a pledge, article 9 requires a written
security agreement signed by the debtor. See U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(a). Compare id. § 2-
201(2) (unobjected-to confirmation removes the bar against a merchant recipient).
Under pre-Code law, some oral nonpledge secured transactions were saved by the equi-
table mortgage doctrine, which, like promissory estoppel, provided an exception to the
writing requirement. See White v. Household Fin. Corp., 158 Ind. App. 394, 302 N.E.2d
838 (1973). But see Warren Tool Co. v. Stephenson, 11 Mich. App. 274, 161 N.W.2d 133
(1968). Equitable mortgage was repudiated by the Code's drafters for article 9. See
U.C.C. § 9-203 official comment 5; G. GILMORE, supra note 30, § 11.4, at 345-46. Estop-
pel has survived, however, under article 2. See, e.g., Warder & Lee Elevator, Inc. v. Brit-
ten, 274 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1979) (U.C.C. does not displace the doctrine of
estoppel).
36. The shipment by ABC Corp. was "a definite and seasonable expression of ac-
ceptance" of XYZ Corp.'s offer. See U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
37. See generally id. §§ 2-307 to -309 (delivery terms), 2-310, -511 (payment terms), 2-
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the conflict.3 8 Representatives of ABC Corporation and XYZ Cor-
poration never met face to face or reduced an agreement to writing.
Nor were they represented by counsel. The formation of this sales
contract was left to informal mercantile customs and usages that
evolved over centuries.
Because ABC Corporation received payment, XYZ Corporation
now has unconditional ownership rights in the lamps. XYZ Corpo-
ration may exploit this property to the complete exclusion of ABC
Corporation. Although First Bank lost its security interest in the
lamps, 9 it acquired a new security interest in the property that was
received in exchange for the lamps: the cash proceeds of the sale.4"
As the new owner, XYZ Corporation can effectively resell the
lamps or lease them to customers. Because XYZ Corporation now
owns the lamps, Second Bank, XYZ Corporation's floorplanner, ac-
quires an enforceable security interest in the lamps. Moreover, it
would make no difference, if, instead of paying cash, XYZ Corpora-
tion had bought the lamps on open credit. ABC Corporation would
be the owner of an account receivable that obligates XYZ Corpora-
tion to pay cash at a future date, and First Bank would have a secur-
ity interest in that account.4 '
The completed sale just described reflects the continuity of
traditional title concepts. A sale, the transfer of the title to the
goods for a price,42 occurred. The effects of the sale are identical
under the Uniform Sales Act,43 which incorporated common-law ti-
305 (price), 2-306 (quantity). See also id. § 1-103 (supplemental bodies of law are still
applicable unless displaced by particular provisions of the U.C.C.).
The Code includes numerous gap-filler provisions that "taken together constitute a
kind of standardized statutory contract." J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, at 129.
Compare Leonard Pevar Co. v. Evans Prods. Co., 524 F. Supp. 546 (D. Del. 1981) (war-
ranties of merchantability and fitness for particular purpose implied) with C. Itoh & Co.
v. Jordan Int'l Co., 522 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977) (arbitration clause not implied).
38. U.C.C. § 2-207(2), (3) (additional terms in acceptance or confirmation).
39. As a "buyer in the ordinary course of business," XYZ Corp. would take title to
the lamps free of First Bank's security interest. See U.C.C. §§ 9-307(1), 1-201(9).
40. U.C.C. § 9-203(3) gives First Bank an automatic claim to proceeds, as defined in
§ 9-306(1), even though the security agreement does not explicitly mention proceeds.
41. As a species of personal property that the Code regulates, namely, an "account"
under U.C.C. § 9-106, XYZ Corporation's duty to pay would be classified as a "non-cash
proceed" under article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-306(1). Article 9 applies to "security interests"
in, as well as "sales" of, accounts. See id. § 9-102(1)(a), (b).
42. Id. § 2-106(1).
43. The Uniform Sales Act, which was drafted by Professor Samuel Williston, was
approved by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1906. R. NORD-
STROM, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF SALES § 3, at 4 (1970). Between 1907 and 1941, it was
adopted in 36 states and the District of Columbia. Id.
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tie principles, and under the Code, which purports to reject these
principles of title.
But the sale might not be completed. The contract might be
terminated 44 or cancelled45 for breach. One of the parties might
repudiate46 the contract or fail to perform properly their obliga-
tions. ABC Corporation might tender nonconforming47 lamps or
XYZ Corporation might bounce the check. In an open credit sale,
XYZ Corporation might file for debtor's relief under the Bankruptcy
Code.4' As a result, XYZ Corporation might never acquire tide to
the lamps, or, if it does acquire title, ABC Corporation might regain
it. In the Code lexicon, which shuns any mention of title, these
events might prevent XYZ Corporation from acquiring sufficient
"rights ' 4 9 in the lamps to create enforceable security interests or
leases.
A priority contest may then arise between ABC Corporation
and someone claiming through XYZ Corporation, a sub-buyer, a
lessee, or even XYZ Corporation's secured creditor, Second Bank.
These third parties, who may be unaware of the state of XYZ Corpo-
ration's ownership of the lamps, may seek to attach their claims to
goods purchased by XYZ Corporation.
A fully executed sale of inventory, which transfers unencum-
bered title to the goods to the buyer and the purchase price to the
seller, will protect third parties like these who must attach their
claim to the buyer's "rights" in the goods. Indeed, the finality and
symmetry of a completed article 2 sale of inventory are compelling
in this respect. With the cash or credit commitment in hand, the
seller and his secured creditor will have been compensated as called
for by their contracts. With indisputable title to the goods now in
the buyer, a title which the seller cannot now defeat, the buyer's
lessees and secured parties can prevail against any claim to the
goods that the seller, or someone claiming through the seller, might
44. "'Termination' occurs when either party pursuant to a power created by agree-
ment or law puts an end to the contract otherwise than for its breach." U.C.C. § 2-
106(3).
45. See id. § 2-106(4). The effect of cancellation is the same as termination except
that "the cancelling party also retains any remedy for breach of the whole contract or
any unperformed balance." Id.
46. See id. § 2-610.
47. "Goods . .. are 'conforming' when they are in accordance with the obligations
under the contract." Id. § 2-106(2).
48. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
49. Under U.C.C. § 1-201(36), "rights" include "remedies," which are defined in
§ 1-201(34) as "any remedial right to which an aggrieved person is entitled with or with-
out resort to a tribunal." Id. § 1-201(34).
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Yet, to complete the symmetry, perhaps the converse should
also be true. An unpaid cash seller of inventory, who is entitled to
reassert title to the goods, 5' should be able to deprive the buyer's
secured creditors and lessees of any derivative claims they might
have to the goods. Moreover, it would seem that the unpaid credit
seller for whom article 2 preserves an ownership claim 52 should be
treated no differently.
But the prevailing Code interpretation rejects these views. In
addressing these types of conflicts, the Code pragmatists favor the
secured party over the unpaid cash or credit seller of inventory.5 s
To accomplish this result, however, they had to swap their contract
analysis for a quasi-title analysis that protects good faith purchasers
of goods from ownership claims.'
This Article submits, however, that the article 2 title principles
in place under the Code protect unpaid, unsecured sellers from se-
cured lenders and lessees who must, under articles 2A and 9, attach
their claims to a buyer's rights to goods. Like their precursors,
these principles of title hold that unpaid sellers may recover the
goods from their buyers and rescind the sale. 5 Yet these principles
also break with the past: the unpaid seller who can reclaim goods
50. The general rule under article 9 is that a security interest continues in sold goods
if it was perfected and the secured party did not authorize the sale. See id. § 9-306(2).
The § 9-307(1) exception is based on the commercial expectations of the inventory fin-
ancier and the buyer in the ordinary course of business. "The test [is] ... whether the
sale was ordinary or predictable in the industry." J. WarrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30,
at 1166. Thus, in Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Millikan, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 637,
350 N.E.2d 590, 592-93, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260, 262-63 (1976), a buyer of textiles took free
of a security interest in them even though the goods were in the possession of a third
party. "In the unlikely.., event that the secured party does not authorize sales, § 9-
307(1) fulfills the reasonable expectation of buyers out of inventory by providing that
buyers in the ordinary course take free of the security interest no matter what the se-
cured lender says about sales." Dolan, The Uniform Commercial Code and the Concept of
Possession in the Marketing and Financing of Goods, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1147, 1189 (1978).
51. See infra notes 71, 116.
52. See U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
53. See Jackson & Peters, Quest for Uncertainty: A Proposal for Flexible Resolution of Inher-
ent Conflicts Between Articles 2 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87 YALE L.J. 908, 945
(1978); see, e.g., Baird & Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of
Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 195 (1983); Dolan, supra note 50, at 1190-92;J. WHrrE &
R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, at § 23-10.
54. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 53, at 207-08 n.95. "[The contract] argument
makes the rights of the finance company . . . turn on a division of ownership rights
between two parties that is buried in a contract. We believe that possession by the
debtor should always constitute sufficient 'rights in the collateral' for a security interest
to attach." Id.
55. See U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
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will be able to defeat secured parties and lessees who must tie their
claim to the buyer's rights in the goods. 56
To see how article 2 title concepts protect the unpaid seller, it is
first necessary to describe these principles and their impact on se-
cured parties and lessees who seek to enforce claims to purchased
goods.
III. ARTICLE 2 TrIES
By its spirit, if not by its terms, article 2 provides for two basic
kinds of title to goods. What the drafters might have called "provi-
sional title" is a temporary title that is dependent upon, and may
shift with, the performance of the article 2 contract. The other
article 2 title, which might be called "indefeasible" title, is per-
manent.58
The two kinds of title differ in terms of the "rights"59 to goods
that they confer on their holders, and hence, on the powers' their
holders will have to create the derivative Code claims. A provisional
titleholder will generally have insufficient rights to the goods to cre-
ate effective security interests and leases in third parties. 6' By con-
trast, an indefeasible titleholder will always have sufficient rights to
create these interests in third parties.62
The presence of indefeasible title, and who has it, will ordina-
rily depend upon the rights and powers that arise under the article 2
contract. The article 2 seller and buyer may agree on when and
what kind of title will pass.63 Should they not address title matters,
56. See id. § 2-702 official comment 3.
57. See infra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
59. The Restatement view is that "property" consists of the familiar bundle of
"rights." "Property denotes the legal relations between persons with respect to a
thing." RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 1 (1936). A "right" is a "legally enforceable claim
of one person against another, that the other shall do a given act or not do a given act."
Id. The "other" is under a correlative "duty," which the Restatement defines as "a legally
enforceable obligation to do or not do an act." Id.
60. A "power is an ability of a person to produce a given change in a given legal
relation by doing or not doing a given act." Id. § 3. It is also the ability "to create,
transfer and divest oneself of rights." Id. The correlative of power is "liability." See also
R. BROWN, supra note 1, § 2; Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16, 30 (1913).
61. See infra note 71.
62. As the rightful holder of all or most of the "sticks" of ownership, the indefeasible
titleholder may create effective derivative property claims to collateral.
63. U.C.C. § 2-401 (1) requires "explicit" agreement about the passage of title as to
"identified" goods. See id. Goods must, however, be in existence before they can be
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article 2 gap-filler provisions will perform this function.' Thus, the
type of title a buyer receives, and when he takes it, may depend en-
tirely upon how the gap-filler provisions of article 2 supplement the
contract of sale.
Section 2-401, one of the gap-filler provisions, provides rules
to determine title when the agreement of the parties does not men-
tion it. In the example above, because ABC Corporation and XYZ
Corporation did not address title matters in their agreement, sec-
tion 2-401 would provide that title to the lamps passed from ABC
Corporation to XYZ Corporation when ABC Corporation delivered
the goods to the carrier for shipment to XYZ Corporation. 5
But section 2-401 does not determine which kind of title the
article 2 buyer takes, and consequently, what "rights" to the goods,
if any, the buyer may sell. Other article 2 gap-filler provisions must
be consulted on that issue. To determine whether a party has ac-
quired a provisional or an indefeasible title, it is necessary to moni-
tor the performance of the article 2 contract.'
The article 2 seller of goods, for example, may have a right to
stop delivery of goods while they are in transit.67 If the seller does
stop delivery, the buyer will be deprived of any provisional title to
the goods that the Code might have given the buyer.6" The buyer
identified. See id. § 2-501 (1). The requirements were identical under prior law. See UNI-
FORM SALES AcT § 17 (1906).
64. See U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (passing of tide).
65. See id. Section 2-401(2) provides for the passage of tide to the buyer "at the time
and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical
delivery of the goods." Il Because no delivery term was specified, the contract be-
tween ABC Corporation and XYZ Corporation was, under Code gap-filler provisions, a
"shipment contract." See id. § 2-504. Under a shipment contract, the seller completes
his physical delivery of the goods when he properly places them "in the possession of a
carrier." Id.
66. "'Contract' means the total legal obligation which results from the parties'
agreement as affected by this [Code]." Id. § 1-201(11). The parties' "agreement,"
which may or may not amount to an enforceable contract, is their bargain in fact. See id.
§ 1-201(3).
67. See id. § 2-705. As a Code remedy under U.C.C. § 2-703(b), the seller's ability to
stop delivery is also a Code "right." See id. § 1-201(36). The right is broadest "where
the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent." Id. § 2-702(1). In that case, he may stop
even small shipments of goods and demand cash. See id. A seller may stop delivery of
larger shipments "when the buyer repudiates or fails to make a payment due before
delivery or if for any other reason the seller has a right to withhold or reclaim goods."
Id. § 2-705(1). Large shipments include carloads, truckloads and planeloads. See id. In
making this distinction, the Code drafters weighed the burden on the carrier in obeying
a stop order and concluded that it is justified even for small shipments when the buyer is
insolvent. See id. § 2-705 official comment 1.
68. "After an effective stoppage under this section the seller's rights in the goods are
the same as if he had never made delivery." Id. § 2-705 official comment 1. Upon a
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will also be deprived of all rights to create security interests in or
leases of the goods, if the buyer has not paid for the goods.6 9 If the
seller does not stop delivery or subsequently reclaim the goods,
then the buyer will obtain indefeasible title to the goods.7"
Once a buyer obtains possession of the goods, a seller may have
a right to assert article 2 reclamation rights.7' Because these recla-
mation rights presuppose nonpayment,7 2 the buyer will not only be
deprived of the provisional title that delivery gave, but also of any
power to create the derivative Code interests.73 Thus, if the seller
does not reclaim the goods, the buyer's title to them will become
resale, the seller may keep any surplus. See id. § 2-706(6); Gilmore & Axelrod, Chattel
Security 1, 57 YALE LJ. 517, 524 (1948). Under the Uniform Sales Act, "the buyer's.
property interest in the goods [was] held subject to [the power to stop delivery] while
the goods [were] in transit." L. VoL, LAW OF SALES § 52, at 259 (2d ed. 1959).
69. "The essential basis of the right of stoppage in transitu is clearly the injustice of
allowing the buyer to have property when he has not paid and, owing to his insolvency,
cannot pay the price that was to be given in return for the goods. In other words, the
fundamental basis of the right is the far reaching principle allowing rescission and resti-
tution where there is actual or prospective failure of consideration." 3 S. WIULSTON,
THE Lw GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS § 518, at 119-20 (rev. ed. 1948). If the buyer has
paid for the goods, his secured party will be able to enforce whatever right the buyer had
to restitution. See State Bank of Young America v. Vidmar Iron, 292 N.W.2d 244 (Minn.
1980). If the stoppage amounts to a breach, the buyer may have a right to replevy the
goods, which right will be enforceable by the buyer's secured party. See U.C.C. § 2-
716(2).
70. The seller can effectively stop delivery until the buyer takes possession or control
of the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-705(2); e.g., Ceres, Inc. v. ACLI Metal & Ore Co., 451 F.
Supp. 921, 924-25 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
71. See U.C.C. 99 2-507, 2-511 (cash sales); id. § 2-702 (credit sales). As Code "rem-
edies," these sellers' "rights" reflect venerable common-law doctrine. Under the com-
mon-law "cash sale" doctrine, the nonpaying cash buyer received no title to the goods.
Consequently, his secured creditors had no "derivative" claim to enforce. E.g., Laughlin
Motors v. Universal C.I.T. Corp., 173 Kan. 600, 604-05, 251 P.2d 857, 861 (1952). See
generally L. VOLD, supra note 68, § 30 (describing bad check cash sales under common
law). The credit seller was treated differently. The insolvent buyer took title to the
goods and the seller was left with a lien on them that could be enforced until the buyer
took possession. The distinction between cash and credit sales was based on the seller's
intent. See Comment, The Owner's Intent and the Negotiability of Chattels: A Critique of Section
2-403 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 72 YALE L.J. 1205, 1211 (1963). In the cash sale, the
seller conditioned the sale on payment. But because the price was deferred in the credit
sale, the seller was held to have sold the goods and assumed the risk of nonpayment. See
id. at 1219-26.
72. In the "cash sale," the buyer's check bounces. In the credit sale, the buyer is
"insolvent," as defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(23), and constructively unable to pay.
73. In both cases, the buyer will take a provisional title to the goods. See supra text
accompanying note 57. The buyer will, however, have the power, but not the right, to
create indefeasible title in good faith purchasers for value under U.C.C. § 2-403(1) even
though such a transfer of title was not "rightful." See U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (warranty of
title breached where transfer not "rightful").
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indefeasible unless the buyer takes steps to throw title to the goods
back to the seller.
For example, after receipt of the goods, the buyer may exercise
rights to reject74 the goods or to revoke acceptance. 5 Upon the
exercise of such rights, title to the goods is restored to the seller.76
If the buyer pursues these remedies after paying for the goods, the
buyer will retain rights to the goods that he, or someone claiming
through him, can enforce even after the title to the goods is restored
to the seller." The title that the seller regains will therefore only be
provisional because it can be defeated by the assertion of such
rights.78
These rescission-like remedies allow the seller to recover title
to the goods or the buyer to return title to the seller.79 In both
cases, any provisional title that the buyer may have had to the goods
will be terminated. Unless the buyer paid the seller for the goods,
third parties who bargained with the buyer for security interests8" or
74. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (buyer's rights on improper delivery).
75. See id. § 2-608 (revocation of acceptance in whole or in part).
76. See id. § 2-401(4). In the case of rejection, title will be restored to the seller even
though the rejection is "wrongful" and amounts to a breach of contract. See id.
77. U.C.C. § 2-711(3) gives the buyer a "security interest" in the goods upon "right-
ful" rejection or "justifiable" revocation of acceptance to the extent that the buyer has
paid for them. These article 2 security interests arise by operation of article 2 law and
are governed by article 9. See id. § 9-113. Because a security interest is a property
"right" which makes the debtor "liable" for payment, the buyer's secured party can
enforce it against the seller to the extent that the buyer could. Article 2 security inter-
ests are foreclosed under article 2 by resale of the goods. See id. § 2-706. The secured
buyer is a "person in the position of a seller." Id. § 2-707. Because title has reverted to
the original seller, the buyer must account to him for any surplus. See id. § 2-706(5).
78. But cf. U.C.C. § 2-706(5), under which the good faith resale buyer "takes the
goods free of any rights of the original buyer." Id.
79. Article 2 preserves the buyer's rights to rescind the contract for material misrep-
resentation or fraud. See id. § 2-721; E. FARNSWORTH, CoN~rRACTS § 4.15 (1982). The
buyer who "wrongfully" rejects goods will usually have no "rights" in them. See U.C.C.
§ 2-703 (seller may cancel). In the unlikely case that he has paid some of the price, he
will be able to set off that amount in a lawsuit by the seller for damages. See, e.g., id. § 2-
708(1) (seller can recover the difference between the market and the "unpaid" contract
prices).
80. Upon a resale of the goods, the seller could pocket the entire proceeds because
U.C.C. § 2-706(5) does not force the seller to account to the buyer for the goods. The
buyer's floorplanner will have no claim to the goods either because the buyer never
"acquired" them. The buyer's article 9 purchase money secured creditor, however,
would stand on a different footing. See id. § 9-107 (purchase money secured creditor
gives value to enable debtor to "acquire rights" in the collateral). Once his security
interest "attaches," see id. § 9-203, it will continue in the goods "notwithstanding [their]
disposition." Id. § 9-306(1)-(2). If the wrongful rejection of the goods amounts to a
default under the security agreement as well, the secured party will be able to replevy
the goods from the seller and assert his security interest in an article 9 foreclosure pro-
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leases 8' in the goods will be ousted of their Code property claims. 82
Thus, under article 2, the acquisition of indefeasible title to
goods by the buyer, and the enforceability of third party claims to
the goods through the buyer, may depend upon whether the seller
exercises remedies to recover the goods from the buyer, or whether
the buyer exercises remedies that foist title to the goods back on the
seller. 83
In the completed sale such remedies will be unavailable even if
the contract was breached. For example, the buyer may accept84
nonconforming goods8" or be barred from revoking acceptance of
such goods.8" In these cases, despite the breach and the cause of
action for damages created by this breach,' the sale will be com-
pleted,"' and the buyer's title to the goods will be indefeasible.89
The buyer will have whatever "rights" are necessary to exploit the
goods by leasing them or by using them as collateral for a loan. Be-
cause of this indefeasible title, the breach notwithstanding, these de-
rivative Code claims to the goods that the buyer creates cannot be
overcome by the seller.
IV. VOIDABLE TITLE
One kind of article 2 provisional title gives buyers the power,
but not the right, to do something that they cannot ordinarily do
with article 2 provisional title. With "voidable title" buyers may cre-
ate indefeasible title to the goods in good faith purchasers for
value.90
ceeding. Any surplus will go to the seller to compensate him for his ownership interest.
See id. § 9-504(l)-(2).
81. See id. § 2A-307(2)(a).
82. Cf supra note 73.
83. See id. § 2-601(a). Section 2-709(1)(b), a specific performance remedy for the
aggrieved seller, permits a seller to hold a buyer responsible for the price of the goods
when he is unable to resell them. In that event, he must hold the goods for the buyer.
See id. § 2-709(2). Thus, an aggrieved seller may be able to foist the goods on the
wrongfully rejecting buyer.
84. See id. § 2-606 (what constitutes acceptance of goods).
85. The buyer might accept with awareness of the nonconformity under U.C.C. § 2-
606(a) and in ignorance of it under § 2-606(b). An "act inconsistent with the seller's
ownership" can also amount to an acceptance under § 2-606(c).
86. See id. § 2-608 (revocation of acceptance in whole or in part).
87. See id. § 2-714 (buyer's damages for breach when goods are accepted).
88. While the buyer must then pay for them "at the contract rate" under § 2-607(1),
the buyer may deduct his damages from the price under § 2-717.
89. See U.C.C. § 2-607(2) (acceptance of goods bars rejection and, if made with
knowledge of the nonconformity, revocation of acceptance).
90. U.C.C. § 2-403(1) provides in part:
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Voidable title arises when the buyer induces the seller, through
fraudulent misconduct, to enter into an article 2 contract of sale. 9'
The seller may rescind the contract for the fraud and recover inde-
feasible title to the goods.92 Unlike other article 2 provisional titles,
the presence of voidable title mandates that the courts look beyond
the rights conferred by the contract of sale to the perceptions of
third party purchasers.9" This provisional title is therefore linked
with, and is inseparable from, "ostensible title," which is really no
title at all but rather a pervasive Code policy' that protects certain
kinds of (but not all) good faith purchasers of goods from prior
Code claims. 95
Ostensible title is grounded on the principle that possession
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to
transfer except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the
extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to
transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value.
Id. The New York Law Revision Commission read § 2-403 as replicating the "historic
test" of the Uniform Sales Act, which stated: "Where the seller of goods has a voidable
title thereto, but his title has not been avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires
a good title to the goods provided he buys them in good faith . 1..." I STATE OF N.Y.
LAw REVISION COMMISSION REPORT, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 455-56
(1955 & reprint 1980).
"Voidable title" is not defined in the U.C.C. and has been characterized a "murky
concept." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, at §§ 3-11. According to Professor
Gilmore, "the [§ 2-403] drafting [was] terribly botched." Gilmore, The Good Faith
Purchase Idea and the U.C.C.: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 U. GA. L. REV. 605,
619 (1981). The Uniform Sales Act also included voidable title provisions. See Uniform
Sales Act §§ 23(1), 24 (1906). Their effect, however, was more limited. See L. VOLD,
supra note 68, § 30, see also S. WILLISTON, supra note 69, § 625a, at 409; Comment, supra
note 71, at 1206.
91. As illustrative examples, § 2-403(1) provides:
the purchaser has such power even though
(a) The transferor was deceived as to the identity of the purchaser, or
(b) The delivery was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored, or
(c) It was agreed that the transaction was to be a "cash sale," or
(d) The delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous
under the criminal law.
U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
92. See id. § 2-402(2).
93. See id. § 2-403(d) (good title can be transferred to a "good faith purchaser for
value.").
94. See id. § 2-403(2) (article 2-buyer in the ordinary course of business); id. § 2A-
304 (article 2A-subsequent lessee of goods); id. § 3-305 (article 3-holder in due
course); id. § 4-209 (article 4-holder in due course); id. § 7-502 (article 7-holder
through due negotiation); id. § 8-302 (article 8-subsequent bona fide purchaser); id.
§ 9-308 (article 9-buyer in the ordinary course of business), id. § 9-309 (subsequent
bona fide purchaser and holder in due course).
95. See, e.g. ,Jackson, Embodiment of Rights in Goods and the Concept of Chattel Paper, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1051 (1983).
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and title to property are so intertwined that innocent third parties
might be misled by a false appearance of ownership.9 6 It shelters a
broad class of third parties who part with value on the strength of
the apparent or "ostensible" ownership of property that possession
implies.9 ' At common law, the innocent parties protected were reli-
ance purchasers who either bought the property outright or took it
as collateral for a loan.98
In general, the Code embodies these marketplace principles
throughout its text. Yet the amount of protection a transferee will
receive, like all other Code consequences, will depend upon the
kind of Code property interest involved in the transaction. The
Code's ostensible title principles are less burdensome on article 2
and 2A title claims than they are on other Code property claims.
For example, under articles 399 and 7,10 thieves can cut off title to
instruments and documents by transferring them to subsequent, un-
suspecting purchasers for value. Yet, barring an estoppel or other
preclusive conduct charged to their owner, under articles 2101 or
96. See, e.g., Clow v. Woods, 5 Serg. & Rawle 275, 288 (Pa. 1819) (unrecorded mort-
gage held void where seller remained in possession). Clow's principles left their tracks
throughout the Code. Section 2-402(2), for example, allows creditors of a seller to treat
as void under state fraudulent conveyancing statutes apart from the Code any sale by a
seller after retention of possession unless done "in good faith." See id.; Dolan, supra note
50, at 1178.
97. Mere possession, however, is not enough. See L. VOLD, supra note 68, § 61.
Under agency or estoppel principles, the owner must be responsible for creating the
misperception. See Porter v. Wertz, 53 N.Y.2d 696, 700-01, 421 N.E.2d 500, 501-02,
439 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106-07 (1981); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 175 (1957). Thus,
Code ostensible title embraces agency and estoppel principles. See U.C.C. § 2-403(1) &
official comment 1 (1972); see also Lawrence, The "Created by His Seller" Limitation of Section
9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 60 IND. L.J. 73, 89-93 (1984); Comment, supra
note 71.
98. "[T]he good faith purchaser idea first showed up in the distribution of goods
from the manufacturer to the user through a factor who would sell or pledge them in
violation of his contract with the manufacturer." Gilmore, supra note 90, at 608. The
theory was that because the manufacturer had voluntarily entrusted goods to the factor,
who was in possession of them with a power of sale, the factor must have had "some
kind of title" upon which third parties could rely. Subject to an estoppel, however, the
factor had no power to pledge the principal's goods for his own debts. See 35 C.J.S.
Factors § 14 (1960). The First English Factors Act, 4 Geo. 4, ch. 83 (1824), was enacted
to protect both good faith buyers or pledgees from factors. Factors acts were also
adopted in America and then largely repealed. The few that remained were preserved
by § 23 of the Uniform Sales Act. See Gilmore, supra note 90, at 614; Warren, Cutting Off
Claims of Ownership under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 471 (1963).
99. See U.C.C. § 3-305(1).
100. See id. § 7-502(l)(b).
101. Section 2-403 requires that the owner either create voidable title to the goods in
the buyer or entrust them to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind. See generally R.
HILLMAN, J. McDONNELL & S. NICKLES, COMMON LAW AND EQUITY UNDER THE UNIFORM
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2A1° 2 thieves cannot do the same with goods.
The article 2A lessor's ownership interest appears to be the
most secure of all. The lessor need not publish notice of it, yet only
one kind of third party purchaser, the revered "buyer in the ordi-
nary course of business, ' ' can defeat it.' The article 9 secured
party's claim receives the least protection from third party purchas-
ers. If the secured party has not published notice of her security
interest in the goods, she will lose out to a broad class of good faith
purchasers for value.' °5
The rights of reclaiming sellers under article 2 are, however,
unsettled. An uncertain relationship has long existed between arti-
cles 2 and 9. Indeed, according to one of the Code's chief scriven-
ers, "[t]he dividing line.., between article 2 good faith purchasers
and article 9 good faith purchasers is not an easy one to draw."'10 6
The introduction of article 2A, the new lease article that was derived
from articles 2 and 9, will aggravate the jurisdictional conflict. The
confusion, which stems from the Code drafters' strong injunctions
against title, can be traced directly to In re Samuels, 0"7 a notorious
case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
V. IN RE SAMUELS.- SECURITY INTERESTS THAT
MASQUERADE AS OWNERSHIP
Samuels involved a priority clash between an unpaid article 2
seller of inventory and a floating lienor of the buyer.'°" The seller
COMMERCIAL CODE 5.04 (1985). "Under 2-403, voidable title is to be distinguished
from void title. A thief, for example, 'gets' only void title and without more cannot pass
any title to a good faith purchaser." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, at 173. The
owner must intend voluntarily to part with his chattel. The issue is "[wihat kind of risks
did the owner take . . . with his chattel?" Comment, supra note 71, at 1216.
102. Cf. U.C.C. § 2A-305 (describing the preclusive conduct required); Rohweder v.
Aberdeen Prod. Credit Ass'n, 765 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1985) (there must exist actual
reliance on language or conduct for estoppel).
103. See U.C.C. § 1-201(9).
104. See id. § 2A-305(2).
105. See id. § 9-301.
106. Gilmore, supra note 90, at 619.
107. In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 834 (1976).
108. The case consumed prodigious legal resources. The referee in bankruptcy held
for the sellers. The district court reversed, holding for the secured party. The court of
appeals reversed and held for the unpaid sellers. In re Samuels & Co., 483 F.2d 557, 563
(5th Cir. 1973). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Packers and Stockyards
Act of 1921, 7 U.S.C. § 181-229 (1988), upon which the court of appeals had relied, did
not apply. Mahon v. Stowers, 416 U.S. 100, 113-14 (1974) (per curiam). On remand,
the court of appeals applied the Code and held for the sellers with Judge Godbold dis-
senting. In re Samuels, 510 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1975). The panel's decision was then
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sought to rescind the sale and recover the equivalent of unencum-
bered ownership of the goods. Because of the magnitude of the
buyer's indebtedness to its secured creditor, the creditor's claim was
coextensive with the goods' value. The Fifth Circuit therefore had
to determine which party had the better right to the goods.
In Samuels, the sellers were ranchers who sold cattle to a
meatpacker on a "grade and yield" basis.' 0 9 The understanding was
that the cattle would first be slaughtered and, after the carcasses
were graded, the sellers would then promptly be paid their due. "0
Secured by a floating lien, C.I.T. Corporation, a finance company,
had on file a notice of a claim to all current and future inventory of
the meatpacker."'I Sellers delivered cattle to the meatpacker, which
issued its check to them in payment. Because C.I.T. had refused to
advance funds to cover the check, it bounced. " 2 Immediately there-
after, the meatpacker filed for bankruptcy." Asserting article 2
reclamation theories, sellers sought to enforce their ownership
rights by recovering the value of the delivered cattle.' 14 C.I.T. con-
tended, however, that its security interest should prevail under arti-
cle 9.115
Article 2 contains two reclamation provisions that allow a seller
to recover the goods, as opposed to damages, from a defaulting
buyer. One, which was received from the common law, applies to
cash sales;" 6 the other applies to credit sales.' "7
reversed per curiam by the court sitting en banc. In re Samuels, 526 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.
1976). The judgment of the district court was affirmed, and Judge Godbold's dissent
was adopted by the majority with five judges dissenting. Id. The Supreme Court denied
certiorari, Stowers v. Mahon, 429 U.S. 834 (1976), and Congress ultimately amended
the Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921 to establish the priority that the sellers sought.
See Act of Sept. 13, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-410, § 8, 90 Stat. 1249, 1251 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 196 (1988)).
109. See 510 F.2d at 146.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 144.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 146.
115. Id. at 148.
116. U.C.C. § 2-507(2) provides: "Where payment is due and demanded on the de-
livery to the buyer of goods or documents of title, his right as against the seller to retain
or dispose of them is conditional upon his making the payment due." Id.
Section 2-511 (1) provides: "Unless otherwise agreed tender of payment is a condi-
tion to the seller's duty to complete any delivery." Id. § 2-511 (1).
Unlike the credit seller's right under § 2-702, see infra note 117, the cash seller's
reclamation right is implicit. See U.C.C. § 3-507 official comment 3. The common-law
origins of these provisions are discussed supra at note 71.
117. U.C.C. § 2-702(2) provides in pertinent part: "Where the seller discovers that
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Under the "cash sale" provisions, a seller may reclaim goods
where a payment, due and demanded on the delivery of the goods
to the buyer, is not made." 8 Code cash sale doctrine further pro-
vides that the buyer's "right as against the seller to retain or dispose
of [the goods] is conditional upon his making the payment due."" 9
The other reclamation provision, which applies to sales made on
open credit, has no common-law counterpart. 2 0  Nor does it ex-
pressly condition the buyer's rights to the goods in the way that the
cash sale provisions do. 2' A predicate for both remedies is that the
seller must notify the buyer, within ten days after the buyer has re-
ceived the goods, of his intention to reclaim.' 22 Even when this con-
dition has been satisfied, however, both reclamation rights may be
cut off by certain good faith purchasers for value.' 23
Because of the deferred payment arrangement that existed be-
tween the ranchers and the meatpacker, a threshold issue was which
of the article 2 reclamation provisions applied. The court con-
the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon
demand made within ten days after the receipt ... ." Id.
118. See supra notes 71, 116 and accompanying text.
119. U.C.C. § 2-507(2).
120. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
121. Compare supra note 117 with text supra accompanying note 119.
122. See supra note 117. Official comment 3 to § 2-507 provides in relevant part:
"The provision of this Article for a ten day limit within which the seller may reclaim
goods delivered on credit to an insolvent buyer is also applicable here." Not all courts
agree, however, that the ten-day limit on reclamation applies to the cash seller. E.g.,
Citizens Bank of Roseville v. Taggert, 143 Cal. App. 3d 318, 323, 143 Cal. Rptr. 729,
732 (1983) (ten-day rule works "unnecessary hardship" on cash seller who will not dis-
cover the check is bad within the 10 days).
The ranchers failed to make their reclamation demand within ten days of Samuels'
receipt of the goods. The court excused the ranchers' noncompliance on the ground
that their failure had not prejudiced C.I.T. The purpose of the requirement, the court
suggested, was to prevent a creditor from relying on a debtor's ostensible ownership.
Because C.I.T. "had such an in-depth knowledge of Samuels' financial affairs, it was well
aware of the claims of [the ranchers] that were unpaid as a result of its refusal to advance
more money," the court argued. See In Re Samuels, 510 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir. 1975).
The dissenter seemed perplexed by the notification requirement. "I have somewhat
greater difficulty than my brothers in pinpointing the purpose of the ten-day rule." Id.
at 157 (Godbold,J., dissenting). Professor Williston suggests that the notification serves
solely to rescind the sale and trigger the seller's right to specific restitution. S. Wiu-is-
TON, supra note 69, § 554. The notification is of no benefit whatsoever to third parties.
See Baird & Jackson, supra note 53, at 209 ("the most troubling weakness of the Code's
reclamation right"). Finally, the ten-day rule may not even apply if the buyer makes a
written misrepresentation of solvency. See U.C.C. § 2-702(2).
123. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) provides: "The seller's right to reclaim . . .is subject to the
rights of a buyer in [the] ordinary course [of business] or other good faith purchaser
under this Article (2-403)." Id. See supra note 122.
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cluded that cash sales were intended 24 and held that, as a re-
claiming seller, the ranchers' rights to the proceeds generated by
the carcasses were superior to C.I.T.'s.125
On the priority issue, the majority appeared to be on solid
ground. It reasoned that, because its check had bounced, the
meatpacker had not tendered under the article 2 contract. 1 26 Con-
sequently, it had no "rights" in the carcasses to which C.I.T. could
attach its article 9 floating lien.' 27 As to the fairness of its holding,
the majority said: "We do not believe that the drafters of the Code
intended for the unpaid sellers to walk away from the transaction
with nothing, neither their goods nor the purchase price, while the
mortgagee enjoys a preferred lien on that for which it refused to
advance payment." 128
In the dissent's view, however, the ranchers no longer had any
goods to recover under article 2 reclamation principles.'2 9 Because
the sellers had sold the carcasses, the dissent reasoned, they had
transferred the title, albeit voidable, to the meatpacker. 3 0 That
made the ranchers financing sellers, which gave them a "security in-
terest"'l'-specifically a purchase money security interest, arising
124. See 510 F.2d at 146. The question was whether the buyer's payment to the sellers
was "substantially simultaneous." See id. Relying on the "established course of dealing"
between them, see U.C.C. § 1-205(1), the court said, "the delay between delivery and
payment was not credit, but rather was the result of a procedure mandated by the Act
and regulations that governed the relationship between the buyer and seller when cattle
are sold on a grade and yield basis." Id. at 146. For similar reasons, courts treat pay-
ment by check as a "cash sale" despite the credit that floats between tender of the check
and its collection. See Void, Worthless Check Cash Sales, "Substantially Simultaneous" and Con-
flicting Analogies, 1 HASTINGS L.J. 111, 111-14 (1950).
125. See 510 F.2d at 151.
126. See id. at 144-49. Tender under the article 2 contract requires that the seller
must deliver the goods and the buyer must accept and pay for them. See U.C.C. § 2-301.
As concurrent, dependent conditions, each party's tender is a condition precedent for
the other's. To put a party in breach of the article 2 contract, the plaintiff must therefore
show that, at the time of the defendant's default, he was ready, willing, and able to per-
form. See id. §§ 2-301, 2-507, 2-511. See generally R. NORDSTROM, supra note 43, § 94.
These sales rules originated with Lord Mansfield's opinion in Kingston v. Preston (K.B.
1773) (reported in Jones v. Barkley, 2 Doug. 684, 99 Eng. Rep. 434,437-38 (K.B. 1781))
and were refined in Morton v. Lamb, 101 Eng. Rep. 890 (K.B. 1797). See C. KNAPP & N.
CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CoNrRACT LAW 716-17 (1987).
127. See 510 F.2d at 145.
128. Id. at 153. See R. HENSON, supra note 21, § 17-2, at 257 (floating lien reaches the
buyer's equity which would be "nothing" without payment).
129. See 510 F.2d at 158 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
130. See id.
131. See id. The dissent argued that, by invoking article 2 reclamation rights, the
ranchers were pressing, in effect, a "title" claim to sold goods. To the dissent, that was
tantamount to an attempt to "reserve" title in an article 2 sale. See id. Under U.C.C. § 2-
401 (1), "[a]ny retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods.., to
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under article 2.132
The dissent contended that article 2 reclamation rights are
nothing more than article 2 security interests which, like virtually all
Code security interests, are governed by article 9.13 Thus, in the
dissent's view, the contest was really between contending secured
parties; and therefore, article 9 neatly controlled the priorities.' 34
Because the ranchers did not comply with the stringent article 9 no-
tice requirements and C.I.T. had complied, C.I.T. should prevail.'1 5
But to reach this conclusion, the dissent was forced to confront
the majority's argument that the meatpacker had not acquired suffi-
cient "rights" in the carcasses to which C.I.T.'s floating lien could
attach. 136  In so doing, the dissent trespassed onto unhallowed
ground. The result was the enduring confusion between Code title
and security interests.
Because the meatpacker had acquired the title to the carcasses,
the dissent reasoned that C.I.T., a Code "purchaser"' 137  for
"value," 138 picked up "title" to the property under its security
agreement. 139 Unfazed by C.I.T.'s decision to withhold the money
that its foundering debtor would have used to pay for the carcasses,
the dissent contended that C.I.T. was the kind of "good faith pur-
the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest." Consequently, the
dissent reasoned that the ranchers were asserting an article 2 security interest. See 510
F.2d at 158-59 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
132. See 510 F.2d at 158 (Godbold, J., dissenting); see also U.C.C. § 9-107 (defining
"purchase money security interest").
133. See 510 F.2d at 158-59 (Godbold,J., dissenting). Article 2 reclamation rights are
subject to both articles 2 and 9. See U.C.C. § 9-113. Security interests that arise in the
check collection process are governed by U.C.C. § 4-208(3).
134. See 510 F.2d at 158-60 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
135. See id. at 160; U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) (first to file or perfect has priority). Because
these were competing inventory security interests, the ranchers could have prevailed
against C.I.T. by complying with its procedures, one of which was a written notification
to C.I.T. by them of their secured claim. See id. § 9-312(3).
136. See 510 F.2d at 159 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
137. The article 1 definition of "purchase," to which the § 2-403 comments refer,
broadly "includes taking by sale, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, issue or
re-issue, gift or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property." U.C.C.
§ 1-201(32). Article 2A also contains a definition of purchase that is much more narrow.
See id. § 2A-103(l)(v); see also Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15
N.Y.U. L.Q. 159, 160 (1938) (purchase for value is "overbroad for intelligent use").
138. A person gives "value" for "rights" if he "acquires them as security for... a pre-
existing claim." U.C.C. § 1-201(44)(b).
139. Under § 2-403, the dissent reasoned, "[t]he buyer is granted the power to trans-
fer good title despite the fact that . . . he lacks the right to do so." 510 F.2d at 154
(Godbold, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). "It is odd to say that title passes with-
out rights passing as well." Baird & Jackson, supra note 53, at 209.
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chaser" whose title was sheltered by section 2-403.4 °
Thus, the dissent concluded, C.I.T. had acquired better title to
the carcasses than its debtor had, a "good title" that carried with
it more than enough rights to enforce the indebtedness.' 4 ' In de-
fense of this outcome, the dissent argued that the ranchers could
have protected themselves from C.I.T "if they had merely complied
with the U.C.C.'s purchase-money provisions. The Code favors
purchase-money financing, and encourages it by granting to a seller
of goods the power to defeat prior liens."' 142
Upon a rehearing en banc, a deeply divided Fifth Circuit
adopted the dissent's position along with its article 9 prescription
for article 2 cash and credit sellers.' 43 A concurring judge acknowl-
edged the "seeming harshness" of a holding that "force[d] a cash
seller to act like a credit seller in order to protect his interest," but
concluded that this "insurance" was worth the price. 14 4
This admonition is echoed by the courts 145 and commenta-
tors14 6 who have, with varying degrees of damnation and praise, en-
dorsed the Samuels result. Nevertheless, the Samuels rule, which
140. See 5 10 F.2d at 155-56 (Godbold, J., dissenting). The majority pointed out that
"the amount of C.I.T.'s cash advances were calculated only after C.I.T. examined weekly
the outstanding accounts and current inventory of the business." Id. at 152. The weekly
advance was determined on that basis. See id. Thus, the majority reasoned: "Since
C.I.T. was so intimately involved in Samuels' financial affairs, it must have known that
when it refused to advance additional funds, unpaid checks issued to cattle sellers by
Samuels would be dishonored." Id. The dissent conceded that "lack of knowledge of
outstanding claims is necessary to the common law [bona fide purchaser]" but the
Code's honesty-in-fact rule, and the reasonable commercial behavior and fair dealing
standards were met. Id. at 156. C.I.T. withheld funds, to the tune of $1 million in ad-
vances "because of Samuels' taking voluntary bankruptcy at a time when its indebted-
ness to C.I.T. was enormous. The decision to terminate further funding was clearly
reasonable." Id. The commentators generally agree with the dissent. See, e.g., J. WHITE
& R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, § 23-10, at 1121. But see American Food Purveyors, Inc.,
17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 436, 442 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (bad faith where secured
party was "totally indifferent" to financial condition of its debtor).
141. See 510 F.2d at 154-56 (GodboldJ., dissenting).
142. Id. at 159-60.
143. See In re Samuels & Co., Inc., 526 F.2d 1238, 1241 (5th Cir. 1976).
144. Id. at 1248 (Gee, J., specially concurring).
145. See, e.g., King Foods v. Erie Farms, 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 109 (Pa. D.
& C. 1981). The Samuels result is so universally accepted that its rule is sometimes in-
voked without citation. See, e.g., In re Bosler Supply Group, 67 Bankr. 71, 73 (N.D. Ill.
1986), rev'd on other grounds, 74 Bankr. 250 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
146. See, e.g., R. HENSON, supra note 21, § 5-5, at 144- 45; others include R. HILLMAN,J.
McDONNELL & S. NICKLES, supra note 101, 18.02[4]; Dolan, The UCC's Consignment Rule
Needs an Exception for Consumers, 44 OHIO ST. LJ. 21 (1983); Wiseman, Cash Sellers, Secured
Financers and the Meat Industry: An Analysis of Articles Two & Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 19 B.C.L. REV. 101 (1977).
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reduces unpaid article 2 sellers to the position of secured parties
and compels them to behave like secured parties, troubles many of
the Code commentators.
47
VI. CODE DIvIsIONS OF OWNERSHIP
The opposing views would agree, at a minimum, on one princi-
ple that should apply to this inter-article dispute. In construing the
Code, the proper place to begin is with the applicable Code provi-
sions: the article 2 reclamation provisions; 48 section 2-403, which
limits the rights of the reclaiming seller;' 49 and the article 9 provi-
sions that determine the extent of the article 9 secured party's deriv-
ative claim to goods.'
*The relevant language of section 2-702, the model for cash rec-
lamation, provides that the seller's "right to reclaim ... is subject to
the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith pur-
chaser under this Article (section 2-403)."'' The relevant language of
section 2-403 provides that a purchaser "with voidable title has
power to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value."'152
While C.I.T. may have been a Code "purchaser," and a good faith
one to boot, under Code title principles, it did not take "title" to the
carcasses.
The Fifth Circuit was correct in calling C.I.T. a "purchaser."'153
Secured parties, like buyers, lessees, and even donees for that mat-
147. See, e.g., J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, § 23-10, at 1122 ("it is not obvi-
ous to us whether the seller or secured creditor has the higher equity"); see also McDon-
nell, The Floating Lienor as Good Faith Purchaser, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 429 (1977) (floating
lienor should rely on sold goods); Comment, The Rights of Reclaiming Sellers when Contested
by Secured Creditors of the Seller, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 934 (1977) (U.C.C. should be inter-
preted to give priority to cash sellers; this result is not at odds with the relevant code
provisions and it is consistent with the common-law origins of reclamation).
148. See U.C.C. § 2-702(2), (3).
149. See id. § 2-403.
150. See id §§ 9-201, 9-203(1)(c).
151. U.C.C. § 2-702 (emphasis added). Subsections (2) and (3) of § 2-403 deal with
entrustment of goods to a "merchant who deals in goods of that kind." The merchant
will have the power to transfer whatever "rights" the entrustor had in the goods to a
"buyer in the ordinary course of business." While the ranchers may have entrusted their
cattle to Samuels, a merchant of cattle, see U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (defining "merchant"),
C.I.T. was not a "buyer in the ordinary course of business." As a Code-secured credi-
tor, C.I.T. did not "buy" the carcasses from Samuels. See U.C.C. 1-201(a). " 'Buying'...
does not include a transfer as security for ... a money debt." Id. § 1-201(9).
152. Id. § 2-403(1) (emphasis added).
153. In re Samuels & Co., 526 F.2d 1238, 1242 (5th Cir. 1976) (adopting on rehearing
the dissenting opinion ofJudge Godbold in In re Samuels & Co., Inc., 510 F.2d 139, 154
(5th Cir. 1975)).
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ter, meet the general Code definition of "purchaser." ' 4 C.I.T. also
gave "value,"' 5 which under the broad Code definition allows past
consideration to meet its test. 1 56 Finally, although every other os-
tensible title provision in the Code is written to shield only unsus-
pecting reliance purchasers,15 7 section 2-403(1) is an exception. By
its express language, the protected class is any "good faith pur-
chaser for value."' 5
But the Fifth Circuit overlooked one key provision and misread
another. While the article 2 reclamation provisions do indeed
subordinate the ownership claims of reclaiming sellers to bona fide
"purchasers" under section 2-403,'59 these provisions are designed
to give priority to reclaiming sellers, like the ranchers, over Code
"creditors" such as C.I.T.
The court overlooked a revealing official comment to section 2-
702(3). The section provides that "[s]uccessful reclamation of
goods excludes all other remedies with respect to them."16 ° In their
official comment, the drafters explain that the seller's right to re-
claim, unlike other Code remedies, is exclusive "because [it] consti-
tutes preferential treatment as against the buyer's other creditors
. ... "6 The general Code definition of "creditor" includes "se-
cured creditors" like C.I.T.162
Although the comments may shed some light on the Code, they
do not drive it. More significant is the kind of bona fide purchaser
that article 2 explicitly protects. The court misread section 2-
403(1), which deals with a purchaser who seeks to acquire "title" to
goods from someone who appears to have it. C.I.T. never sought to
acquire ownership of goods. Rather, it was an article 9 "secured
party" hoping to acquire an enforceable "security interest" in the
goods.163
154. See U.C.C. § 1-201(32).
155. See id. § 1-201(44).
156. See id. § 1-201(44)(b).
157. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
158. U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
159. See id. § 2-702(3).
160. Id.
161. See id. § 2-702 official comment 3.
162. See id. § 1-201(12). In his comment to an early Code draft, Karl Llewellyn saw a
large role for reclamation. He wrote that it would provide a basis by which cash sellers
may be able to assert rights in goods "[als against the buyer, his creditors, and any
general representative of the buyer's creditors." THE UNIFORM REVISED SALES AcT § 58
comment, at 197 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
163. Section 2-403(1) deals with transfers of "title" to, and "limited interests" in,
goods. "Limited interests," which the section defines in terms of "rights," include se-
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"Title" and "security interest" have different Code mean-
ings."6 Under the Code, secured parties do not take "title" to
goods, only article 2 "buyers" do.' 65 Secured parties attach their
claims to whatever rights the debtor has in the property. Because it
did not tender, the meatpacker had no article 2 rights against the
ranchers.' 66 In short, C.I.T. did not expect to acquire the "good
title" to the carcasses that the Fifth Circuit gave it.
No court that has dealt with the kind of dispute raised in Samuels
has focused on the distinction between Code "title" and "security
interests." As the text of the Code demonstrates, however, the
drafters meant to distinguish between these claims to goods. For
example, in the article 2 sale, sellers of goods give two warranties:
they warrant their "good title"' 67 to the goods and that the goods
are free of any security interests. '" Also, a rejecting or revoking
buyer may retain a "security interest'' 61 in the goods while simulta-
curity interests. See U.C.C. § 2-403 official comment 1. Section 2-403(1) states: "A
purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer
except that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the
interest purchased." Unlike title to goods, "limited interests" in them are not negotia-
ble under section 2-403(1). Thus, while one without rights to goods may have a
"power" to convey "title" to them to a buyer in an article 2 sale, one will have no such
power to transfer "rights" to them to a secured party in an article 9 secured transaction.
See also id. § 9-318 (assignee's rights to account no greater than assignor's).
Article 3 grants to the transferor of a "limited interest" the power that the article 2
transferor lacks. Section 3-302(4) regulates the purchase of "limited interests" in in-
struments. Under it, the holder of an instrument that is subject to an ownership claim
can subordinate it to his secured creditor's claim if the latter meets the bona fide pur-
chaser for value requirements of article 3 by taking as a holder in due course. According
to the drafters, "[tihis is merely a special application of the general rule ... that a pur-
chaser of a limited interest acquires rights only to the extent of the interest purchased."
Id. § 3-302(4) official comment 4.
164. Article 9 covers "security interests" in personal property. Two kinds of outright
sales of intangibles are, however, governed by article 9. Compare id. § 9-102(l)(a) (crea-
tion of security interests) with id. § 9-102(1)(b) (sale of accounts, contract rights, and
chattel paper). "Commercial financing on the basis of accounts and chattel paper is
often so conducted that the distinction between a security transfer and a sale is blurred,
and a sale of such property is therefore covered .... Id. § 9-102 official comment 2.
165. "Title" is "sold" by a "seller" to a "buyer." See id. § 2-106(1). A "seller" is the
person who "sells or contracts to sell goods." Id. § 2-103(1)(d). A "buyer" is the per-
son who "buys or contracts to buy goods." Id. § 2-103(l)(a).
166. See id. § 2-507(2) (no "right" against seller) ("Where payment is due and de-
manded on the delivery to the buyer .... his right as against the seller.., is conditional
upon his making the payment due.").
167. See id. § 2-312(l)(a). The official comments refer to a "good, clean title." Id. § 2-
312(l)(a) official comment 1. See also R. NORDSTROM, supra note 43, § 58, at 186 ("The
title to which [the buyer] is entitled ought to be one that is free from colorable claims
which existed at the time he purchased ....
168. See U.C.C. § 2-312(l)(b).
169. See id. § 2-711(3).
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neously passing "title 170 to the goods back to the seller. Finally, a
party who has either "title" to goods or a "security interest" in them
will have a cause of action against a third party who injures the
goods. 171
Even section 2-403 distinguishes between article 2 and article 9
purchasers. Section 2-403 directs secured party purchasers like
C.I.T. to article 9 for a determination of their rights.' 72 Because
section 2-403 is the only limitation on the reclamation rights of both
cash and credit sellers, these sellers should therefore prevail against
a floating lien creditor in a Samuels contest.17 3
Nor is there a statutory basis for transforming reclaiming sellers
into secured parties and applying article 9 priority rules. Like the
distinction the Code makes between title and security interests, arti-
cle 2 distinguishes between its reclaiming sellers and secured par-
ties. Thus, a buyer who rightfully rejects goods or revokes his
acceptance of them will retain an article 2 "security interest" in the
goods to the extent that the buyer has made payments toward the
purchase price. 74 Sellers who ship goods under a negotiable bill of
lading also will have an article 2 "security interest" in the goods for
their price.' 75 When the article 2 drafters meant to create article 2
security interests, they stated so explicitly.' 76  Reclamation rights
are not so designated, suggesting that they were meant to be gov-
erned by other principles. 177
170. See id. § 2-401(4).
171. See id. § 2-722(a).
172. "The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien creditors are governed by
the Articles on Secured Transactions (Article 9), Bulk Transfers (Article 6) and Docu-
ments of Title (Article 7)." Id. § 2-403(4).
173. A similarly vexing issue existed under a prior version of § 2-702 when the statute
read that the reclaiming seller also took subject to the "rights of... a lien creditor under
this Article (Section 2-403)." Id. § 2-702(3) (1962). Courts searched article 2 in general
and § 2-403 in particular for such rights in vain until the statute was amended in 1966.
See Braucher, The U.C.C.-A Third Look?, 14 CASE W. RES. 7 (1962).
174. See U.C.C. § 2-711(3).
175. See id. § 2-505(1)(a).
176. The authorities are sharply divided over whether article 2 reclamation rights are
article 2 security interests. See Marshack, The Return of the Reclaiming Seller: New Decisions
Under the Bankruptcy Code and the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 187, 205-35
(1984). Unwilling to choose sides, White and Summers call them "quasi security
claim[s]." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, at § 7-17.
177. To support their view that article 2 reclamation rights are article 2 security inter-
ests, Jackson and Peters rely on the general article I definition of security interest and
the "drafting pattern of Article 2 that emphasizes the consequences rather than the la-
beling of commercial relationships." Jackson & Peters, supra note 53, at 926. According
to them, a seller's right to stop delivery under § 2-705 should also be classified as an
article 2 security interest because of the "plausible" references to that section in the
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As esteemed common-law lawyers, the Fifth Circuit judges
might be excused for failing to distinguish a title claim from a secur-
ity interest. Under the common law and the Uniform Sales Act, se-
cured parties took title to goods."' 8 In Samuels, however, the Fifth
Circuit applied title concepts that the drafters of the original Code
discarded. In creating security interests, the Code's drafters never
intended to give secured parties "title" to goods.
The legislative history of the Code also repudiates the Samuels'
result.' 79 To understand how title to goods and security interests in
them were intended to relate under the Code, and why the courts
have confused them, the Code's drafting history will next be
reviewed.
VII. 1945-1989: FORGING THE DISCRETE CODE CLAIMS TO GOODS
The original blueprint for the Code, which excluded leases of
official comment to § 9-113. See id. at 921 n.59. An examination of the comment, how-
ever, suggests otherwise. It distinguishes between "security interests" and "rights of...
stoppage under Section... 2-706... which are similar to the ights of a secured party."
U.C.C. § 9-113 official comment 1 (emphasis added). The comment further provides
that "[tihe use of the term 'security interest' in the Sales Article is meant to bring the
interests so designated within this Article." Id. (emphasis added). Their analysis creates
conceptual difficulties with the seller who stops delivery and reacquires ownership of the
goods. "If the seller's justifiable withholding of delivery furnishes the paradigm for Arti-
cle 9 supervision, as an Article 9 security interest, . . . the seller's reacquisition can
hardly escape similar characterization." Jackson & Peters, supra note 53, at 933. In
other words, this seller is, simultaneously, both an owner and a secured party.
178. See infra notes 181-184 and accompanying text.
179. See infra Part VII. According to official comment 3 to § 9-312:
The reason for the additional requirement of notification [under Section 9-
312(3)] is that typically the arrangement between an inventory secured party
and his debtor will require the secured party to make periodic advances against
incoming inventory or periodic releases of old inventory as new inventory is
received. A fraudulent debtor may apply to the secured party for advances
even though he has already given a security interest in the inventory to another
secured party. The notification requirement protects the inventory financer in
such a situation: if he has received notification, he will presumably not make an
advance; if he has not received notification (or if the other interest does not
qualify as a purchase money security interest), any advance he may make will
have priority. Since an arrangement for periodic advances against incoming
property is unusual outside the inventory field, no notification requirement is
included in subsection (4).
U.C.C. § 9-312 official comment 3. The Code's spirit also repudiates the Samuels result.
While Professor Rapson concurs with Professor B. Clark, that § 2-403 "[fits] like a
glove" to Samuels, he suggests that voidable title was not designed to protect the secured
party who extended old value and did not rely. See Rapson, A 'Home Run'Application of
Established Principles of Statutosy Construction: U. C. C. Analogies, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 441, 446
(1983) (citing B. CLARK, supra note 26, at 8-43 (1980)). The Code drafters would agree
with Professor Rapson.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 50:408
goods, contemplated that sales and secured transactions would be
regulated by two separate articles. 8 ° From the very beginning,
however, a Gordian knot confronted the drafting teams that were
designated by the Code's sponsors to draw the jurisdictional line
separating these two articles.
The problem was the pervasiveness of title in property law. At
common law, as well as under the first sales and chattel security stat-
utes, both buyers of goods and lenders who took goods as collateral
for loans could hold "title" to the goods.' In 1945, when the two
drafting teams set to work, a transfer of the title to goods was still a
central step both in completing a sale and creating most security
interests in goods. In short, both lenders and buyers bought
goods. '8 2
These pre-Code security titles were provisional ones, akin to
those that exist today under article 2. The performance or nonper-
formance of the primary condition of the security contract, namely
discharge of the debt, determined the location and quality of title as
it currently does under the article 2 sales contract. Until the condi-
tion was fulfilled, the financing party maintained provisional title to
the goods.'8 " If the condition was not fulfilled, the financing party's
provisional title became an indefeasible one with its accompanying
rights to exploit the goods.1
8 4
180. For a concise history of the Code, see R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEIGERT, INTRODUC-
TION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 19-31 (1977).
181. See L. JONES, THE LAW OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES § 1 (R.
Bowers ed. 1933) (title conveyed to chattel mortgagee); L. VOLD, supra note 68, at § 57
(title retained by conditional seller). An exception was the "pledge" in which possession
of goods was transferred to the pledgee while the pledgor retained his title to them. See
L. JONES, supra, at § 4.
182. See UNIFORM SALES ACT § 1 (1906) (sale defined as transfer of "property" in the
goods); L. JONES, supra note 181, at § 1 (formal mortgage of property as "conditional
sale of it"). By then the "minority" rule that foreshadowed the article 9 property inter-
est was in force for chattel mortgages. Some jurisdictions treated them as "creating a
mere lien on the property" rather than ownership. See id.
183. See supra note 182. "Under the earlier common law rule, the chattel mortgage
operates as a sale vesting legal title in the mortgagee subject to defeasance by perform-
ance of the conditions of the mortgage." L. JONES, supra note 181, at 3. In describing
the conditional sale, Professor Gilmore said, "if a seller had agreed to make an absolute
sale to his buyer, then, once he had lost possession, he could be only a creditor for the
price; nevertheless, if he had made the sale only on a condition that the buyer perform
some act (such as payment of the price), then it must follow that, on condition broken,
the contract was at an end, the status quo ante should be restored and the seller, if he
had lost possession of the goods, should get them back." G. GILMORE, supra note 30, at
66 (emphasis in original). "At common law ... [the] conveyance passed the whole legal
title to the mortgagee, subject to be defeated on condition subsequent," 59 C.J.S. Mort-
gages § l(b)(2) (1949).
184. The seller could also waive a breach.
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In form, too, these pre-Code chattel security devices mimicked
outright sales of goods. The mortgagee typically obtained his title
from the mortgagor as a buyer would: by extracting a bill of sale
from the mortgagor." 5 In the conditional sale, the contract of sale
simply deferred the passage of title until payment of the contract
price.'1 6 Consequently, the written instruments that established
pre-Code secured transactions were often identical to those that cre-
ated outright sales.'8 7
To complicate matters further for the Code's drafters, timing
and organizational factors aggravated the jurisdictional issue that di-
vided article 2 and article 9. 8 The article 9 project proceeded at a
much slower pace than the article 2 project, 8 9 and there was a lack
[A]s an alternative to retaking the goods [the seller]... could act as if the
breach of condition had not occurred, as if the sale had been absolute in the
first place, and hold the buyer for the unpaid price; if the seller elected to con-
tinue with the contract, waiving the condition, he obviously lost his special right
against the goods.
G. GILMORE, supra note 30, at 66.
185. L. JoNES, supra note 181, at § 19.
186. Id. at § 8.
187. Because of the provisional nature of the mortgagee's title, parol evidence was
always freely admissible on behalf of the debtor to show the debtor's overriding owner-
ship interest in the goods.
A, the present owner, gives B ... a bill of sale of personal property. Subse-
quently A alleges that the true transaction between himself and B was a loan
secured by a mortgage ....
The courts have . . . shown themselves willing to listen to A's story; the
parol evidence rule has opened up like a leaky sieve to allow A to vary, contra-
dict and explain his own deed or bill of sale.
G. GILMORE, supra note 30, at 48 (footnote omitted). At law, an absolute bill of sale
under seal could not be shown by parol evidence to have been intended as a mortgage.
See L. JONES, supra note 181, at § 21. However, in equity, clear and convincing parol
evidence could turn a bill of sale into a mortgage. See id. at § 22; see, e.g., Hill v. Scott,
101 Vt. 356, 143 A. 276 (1928) (permitting evidence of an oral agreement in connection
with a bill of sale under seal to show that the bill of sale was to be held as security).
Unconstrained by such rigid divisions between law and equity, § 2-102 contains an iden-
tical rule: "[Tihis Article ... does not apply to any transaction which although in the
form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is intended to operate only as a
security transaction." U.C.C. § 2-102.
188. "One of the sad truths about the Code is that its several articles were never coor-
dinated as they should have been. The lack of coordination between Article 2 on sales
and Article 9 on secured transactions is glaringly evident." Gilmore, supra note 90, at
628. The chief reporter for the entire Code project was Karl Llewellyn who, along with
Soia Mentschikoff, the associate chief reporter for the project, drafted article 2. Allison
Dunham and Grant Gilmore, as the chief and associate chief reporters respectively,
drafted the secured transactions article. See Goodrich, Forward, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE FINAL TEXT EDITION (1951); see alsoJ. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, at 4.
189. An article 2 draft, substantially similar to the current version, was approved by
the Code's sponsoring bodies in 1943. As late as 1948, however, the proposed secured
transactions article (article 9) was fragmented. Tentative Draft No. 2-article VII of that
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of coordination between these two projects. Uncertain about what
was rightly theirs to regulate, the article 2 team included in its first
drafts chattel security provisions that ultimately would be incorpo-
rated into article 9.190
It quickly became clear, however, that title and security inter-
date, entitled "Secured Commercial Transactions"--dealt with inventory and accounts
receivable financing as well as consignments of goods. See 5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE DRA-rs 127 (E. Kelly ed. 1984) [hereinafter U.C.C. DRAvts]. The projected or-
ganization of the secured transactions article called for separate chapters dealing with
consumer goods (I), farmers (II), and merchants and equipment (IV) as well as "other
chapters on pledges and other security devices." Id. This plan was ultimately aban-
doned in favor of the unitary structure of the present article 9 which recognizes only two
kinds of security "devices," namely, purchase money security interests and all other se-
curity interests, and distinguishes them by the collateral involved. See U.C.C. § 9-102
official comment 5.
190. The Uniform Revised Sales Act, offered by the article 2 drafters on April 27,
1944, as the sales chapter of the proposed Code, contained § 55, which gave a financing
buyer a "lien" to the extent of his "enabling advances" to the seller. See 2 U.C.C.
DRArS, supra note 189, at 5. Section 57 of this draft also defined "purchase" for pur-
poses of the proposed sales chapter to include "taking by mortgage or pledge." Id.
Section 2-403 of the proposed final draft of the Code still governed the priority between
a buyer in the ordinary course of business and the secured party. See U.C.C. PROPOSED
FINAL DRAfr, TEXT & COMMENTS ED. (1950), reprinted in 9 U.C.C. DRAvrs, supra note 189,
at 255. According to the chairman of the Code's editorial board, the first Code draft,
issued in May of 1949, was "tentative" and "obviously incomplete in many respects."
Goodrich, Foreword to U.C.C. (1949 Draft), reprinted in 7 U.C.C. D -rrs, supra note 189, at
5. Section 2-102, the scope section of the 1949 article 2 draft, provided in part: "Unless
otherwise explicitly provided: (a) This article is not applicable to any transaction intended to
operate only by way of mortgage, pledge.., or other security transaction." (Emphasis
added).
Section 2-405 of the 1949 draft, the predecessor to the current § 2-403, was
designed to be one of these "explicit" provisions. According to the drafters, it was
"phrased and intended to be taken broadly enough to cover a contract for security trans-
fer which happens to be cast in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present
sale." U.C.C. § 2-102 comment (1949 Draft), reprinted in 7 U.C.C. DRAvrs, supra note
189, at 62.
Section 2-405 provided in relevant part:
A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor has or has
power to transfer; and in particular a good faith purchaser for value who is not
a pawnbroker and to whom goods have been delivered .. .acquires:
(a) good title if his transferor has a voidable title which has not been
avoided at the time, including as "voidable" a title derived under a [fraud-
ulently induced contract of sale]; and
(b) the title of both his transferor and of any prior purchaser from the
transferor if the transferor has retained possession ... ; and
(c) the title of both the transferor and of any person who has made
delivery to the transferor on conditional sale if his transferor is a merchant
who deals in goods of the kind.
U.C.C. § 2-405 (1949 Draft), reprinted in 7 U.C.C. DRAvrs, supra note 189, at 160. The
1949 draft's version of § 2-702 subjected the reclaiming credit seller to the "rights of a
good faith purchaser for value under this Article (Section 2-405)." See supra note 184.
The current § 2-102 does not contain the prefatory language emphasized above.
438
1991] TrrILE UNDER THE U.C.C. 439
ests were destined to be separate property interests in the new
Code. At the outset, the article 2 drafting team rejected the term
"title" as descriptive of the security interests that their new article
would ultimately cover along with title. In the early article 2 drafts,
the "title" to the financed goods was transferred to the buyer. 191
The financing seller who sought to retain title to sold goods, the
conditional seller of the common law, kept a ghost, a "security title"
instead. 192
It also soon became clear that "security interests" and "title"
were destined to be very different kinds of Code property claims. As
the projects moved forward, the article 2 team took careful note of
the emerging article 9 "security interest." 193 As it became the main-
stay of article 9, the financing seller's "security title" faded under
article 2.194 Eventually, all references to "security title" in article 2
were scrapped in favor of the "security interest" that had become
the core property claim of the new article 9.
In the completed Code, the jurisdictional lines were drawn.
Separate articles governed outright transfers of title to goods and
References to secured transactions matters still linger, however, in the current official
comments to § 2-403. See U.C.C. § 2-403 official comment 1.
191. See U.C.C. § 2-104 (1949 Draft), reprinted in 7 U.C.C. DAFrs, supra note 189, at
65.
192. Section 2-401(2) of the 1949 Draft provided in relevant part that:
[T]itle passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes
his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite
any reservation of security title. .. and in particular despite any reservation of
security title.., by the bill of lading.
U.C.C. § 2-401(2) (1949 Draft), reprinted in 7 U.C.C. DRAFrs, supra note 189, at 155.
See also U.C.C. § 2-505 (1949 Draft), reprinted in 7 U.C.C. DRAwrs, supra note 189, at
177 (negotiable bill of lading procured by seller reserves "security title"). According to
the official comment to this section:
The security title reserved to the seller.., is restricted to securing payment or
performance by the buyer and the seller is strictly limited in his disposition and
control of the goods as against the buyer and third parties. The security inter-
est, therefore, must be regarded as a means given to the seller to enforce his
rights against the buyer which is unaffected by and in turn does not affect the
location of title generally.
Id. § 2-505 official comment 1 (1949 Draft), reprinted in 7 U.C.C. DRAFrs, supra note 189,
at 177.
193. See 10 U.C.C. DRAFTs, supra note 189, at 91, 183, 187, 191, 193, 237.
194. In the Proposed Final Draft of the Code, submitted on March 15, 1950, by the
Editorial Board for approval, "security title" was no longer to be found in article 2. The
term "security interest" appeared in all the relevant article 2 sections save one. See id. at
79-311; U.C.C. PROPOSED FINAL DRAF, TExT & COMMENTS ED. (1950). A seller who
"reserved" title to delivered goods under § 2-401 was "limited" in his claim to "security
for their price." See 10 U.C.C. DRAFrs, supra note 189, at 183. By 1952, when the Code
was finally approved by the sponsoring bodies, "security interest" appeared uniformly
throughout its goods articles.
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secured transactions, which thrived on rights to goods. Only article
2 sellers and buyers held "title" to goods. Secured sellers and lend-
ers held "security interests" in goods, something less than title.
Any article 2 sale, even one in which the seller became a secured
party, resulted in the transfer of the "title" to the goods to the
buyer.' 95
Two sets of rules protected the financial stake of the unpaid
seller in the article 2 sale. He could bargain for an article 9 security
interest in the sold goods either by executing an article 9 security
agreement or by reserving "title" to the goods in the article 2 con-
tract of sale.' 96 In both cases, the buyer took title to the purchased
goods and the seller ended up with the same "security interest"
held by an article 9 counterpart. If the seller chose to sell goods
without opting to retain a security interest in them, article 2 recla-
mation principles protected him.' 97 Today, the distinctions that the
Code makes between reclaiming sellers and secured parties are in-
corporated in the Bankruptcy Code. 9
Yet, given its original limited mandate, the new Code had not
preempted the field of bargained-for property interests in goods.
Because of the increasing commercial importance of leases and the
unsettled nature of the law governing them, the Code's sponsors
eventually approved a lease project. t 99 This created another Code
property claim to goods between a lessor and a lessee, the "lease-
hold interests. 20 0
Like articles 2 and 9, article 2A suffered from a lack of coordina-
195. See U.C.C. §§ 2-106, 2-401.
196. See U.C.C. 8§ 9-501 to -506 (describing secured party's rights and remedies
under a security agreement); id. at § 2-401 (allowing the seller to reserve a security in-
terest); id. at §§ 2-701 to -710 (seller's remedies).
197. See id. § 2-702(2), (3).
198. Section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 subjects the trustee's claim to
"any statutory or common law right of a seller of goods ... to reclaim such goods if the
debtor has received such goods while insolvent." 11 U.S.C. § 546(c) (1988). The refer-
ences to "statutory" and "common law" reclamation rights were designed to cover § 2-
702 and cash sale theories. SeeJ. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 30, § 23-10; Sturm,
U.C.C. Section 2-702(2): An Unsecured Seller's Right to Reclaim Goods, 9 N. ILL. L. REV. 299,
304-06 (1989).
199. Article 2A, a revision of the Uniform Personal Property Leasing Act, was ap-
proved by the Permanent Editorial Board of the Code in March of 1987. The reporter
for article 2A was Ronald DeKoven. The final text of the article was approved by the
Code's sponsors in August of that year. See U.C.C. § 2A-101 official comment.
200. See id. § 2A-103(l)(m). The "lessee" acquires from the "lessor" the rights to
possession and use under the lease. See id. § 2A-103(l)(n),(p). But the lessor retains a
"residual interest," whatever remains of the goods after the lease. See U.C.C. § 2A-
103(1)(q).
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tion and input during its drafting.2"' Still, when the article 2A draft-
ing team set to work to fit the new lease article into the Code, the
task at hand was much less imposing than the one confronting their
predecessors. For unlike the seller and buyer of goods, and the
mortgagee who held the goods as collateral, the lessee of the goods
never held title to them.
Given the lessee's traditional yet restricted rights to exploit the
goods through possession and use over a specified term, the lessee's
article 2A property interest was destined to be something less than
the "title" retained by the lessor and governed by article 2. Yet,
because the lessee had these rights of exploitation, a lease would be
more than the contingent article 9 "security interest," which the se-
cured party could only enforce upon an agreed default. If a lease
was neither a sale nor a security interest, it was something in be-
tween. It is hardly surprising then that the article 2A drafters bor-
rowed liberally from articles 2 and 9 in creating article 2A.2 °2
For ostensible title matters, the drafters looked more to article
2 than to article 9 and enhanced the rights of owners of goods even
further. 20 3 The result was an article even more restrictive in its pro-
tection of third parties than article 2. Under article 2A, a lessor, like
201. Article 2A was not thought out carefully as to whether it should conform concep-
tually to article 2 or 9, according to Harry Sigman, Esq., panelist, "The Emerging New
UCC" A.L.I.-A.B.A. Conference September 7, 1989. Another panelist referred to the
"small paid staff" and the absence of scholarly input during the article 2A drafting pro-
cess. Moreover, article 2A, which was presented to the American Law Institute in "es-
sentially complete form," was approved by a mail vote of the executive committee of the
U.C.C. and the Council of A.L.I. and merely reported to the memberships of the two
bodies. Under a new operating agreement effective in July 31, 1986, the Permanent
Editorial Board will have more control over the Code drafting process. See Kripke, Some
Dissonant Notes about Article 2A, 39 ALA. L. REV. 791, 794 (1988).
202. The product they created was admittedly flawed. "These existing Articles [2 and
9]... have certain imperfections revealed by the long experience since their adoption.
Article 2A cannot overcome these imperfections but seeks to minimize their significance
as applied to leases." Hazard, Foreword, U.C.C. article 2A. Among these imperfections
are the article's voidable title provisions. Section 2A-304(1) is based on § 2-403. See
U.C.C. § 2A-304(1) official comment. Although § 2A-304(1) is consistent with general
Code ostensible title policy, it is certain to exacerbate the confusion among the Code's
goods articles. On the one hand, it is inconsistent with Samuels. Section 2A-304(l) pro-
vides that "a lessor with voidable title has power to transfer a good leasehold interest to
a good faith subsequent lessee for value." Id. § 2A-304(l) (emphasis added). The implica-
tion is that only lessees who actually rely on the lessor's ostensible title to the goods are
protected from a reclaiming seller. On the other hand, it is inconsistent with § 2A-
306(2), which seems to treat the defrauded article 2 seller as a "lien creditor" of the
lessor who can avoid both the sale and the lease contract. Section 2A-103(1)(r) broadly
defines a "lien" as an "interest" in goods that secures payment of a debt or performance
of an obligation but that is not a "security interest." Id. § 2A-103(l)(r).
203. See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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the reclaiming seller, need not file notice of his claim to protect it
from secured creditors of his lessee. 2° And if the lessee attempted
to sell the leased good outright, the buyer will only take whatever
rights to possession and use that the lessee bargained for under the
lease.2 o5
SUMMARY
Under today's Code, certain ownership secrets can be kept
from secured parties. The lessor's unpublished title to leased goods
is one example. 20 6 The reclaiming seller's title claim should be an-
other. 20 7 Yet, fueled by the In re Samuels view that reclaiming sellers
are article 2 secured parties, the trend has been to reduce these con-
tending property claims to security interests, a process that dooms
owners of goods to floating lienors of record.20 8
204. U.C.C. § 2A-101 official comment; id. at § 2A-301 official comment. But a lessor
may file in accordance with § 9-408 to protect the claim in the event that a court ulti-
mately concludes that it is a sham. See infra note 212 and accompanying text. The issue
of whether to impose filing requirements on leases was a hotly contested one. See
Mooney, The Mystery & Myth of "Ostensible Ownership" and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of
Proposals to Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REv. 683,685 (1988). Under the
"meager statutory treatment" afforded by prior statutes and the common law, the true
lessor was not required to file. Exceptions were South Carolina and Idaho, which re-
quired recording of livestock leases. See id. at 694 n.40. Some commentators contend
that true leases should be filed. Professor Kripke for one, believes that there is "no
distinction" between secured transactions and true leases, which he regards as a "con-
tinuum comprised of an infinite variety of transactions." Pigeonholing is therefore "ar-
tificial." Kripke, Book Review, 37 Bus. LAw. 723, 727 (1982). See also Jackson & Peters,
supra note 53, at 947 (treating unconditional delivery of contract goods the same as
goods delivered under a contractual reservation of tide).
205. See U.C.C. § 2A-305, in which § 2-403 is most nearly replicated. Under this sec-
tion, a lessee with a "voidable" leasehold interest has power to transfer only a "good
leasehold interest" to a good faith buyer for value. By subsection (2), however, a "buyer
in the ordinary course of business" from a lessee who is a merchant of goods of the kind
involved, can take "all of the lessor's rights to the goods." Id. at § 2A-305(2). The
drafters point out in their official comment that this rule is "consistent with existing case
law that prohibits the bailee's transfer of title to a good faith purchaser for value under
§ 2-403(1)." In support, they approve Rohweder v. Aberdeen Prod. Credit Ass'n, 765
F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1985). See id. at § 2A-305 official comment.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 103 and 104.
207. See U.C.C. § 2-702 (seller may reclaim any goods received by the buyer on
credit).
208. The trend's impact has been felt in two areas. Courts still routinely struggle to
distinguish between true leases and secured transactions. See Mooney, Personal Property
Leasing: A Challenge, 36 Bus. LAw. 1605, 1610 (1981): "[A]s a group, [the cases] are
hopelessly contradicting and confusing." Some pragmatists have even resorted to title
concepts to resolve the issue. See T. BAIRD & D. JACKSON, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PER-
SONAL PROPERTY 93 (2d ed. 1987). In 1987, § 1-201(37), which offers guidelines to dis-
tinguish between secured transactions and leases, was revised. See also Harrell, Sales
Related Conflicts Between Articles 2 and 9, 22 U.C.C. LJ. 134, 136 (1989) (arguing that when
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The powerful taboos against tide have convinced Code thinkers
that the property claims asserted by reclaiming sellers and secured
parties are identical.2" 9 It is hardly surprising that the pragmatists
feel frustrated by a lack of "firm guidance" from the Code's drafters
about how to contend with these unpaid claimants to goods.210 A
couple of them have even made the wistful suggestion that "perhaps
all of these conflicts should be resolved on the basis of the particular
equities of the particular parties in the particular circumstances in
which they find themselves." '2 11
Because the prevailing view represses ownership concepts, it
lacks perspective. Every transaction in goods, from the loan of a
lawnmower among neighbors to a three-party equipment lease, can
be said to involve financing aspects, an insight that was not lost on
the Code's drafters when they formulated their new lease article. 212
As its drafting history demonstrates, however, the Code was
designed to establish distinctive property interests in goods, as
molded by the contracts that govern them, to be used to place the
various transactions involving them in their proper Code context.21 3
Each Code property claim is as unique as the contract that gov-
erns it. Title claimants such as lessors and reclaiming sellers have
more potent interests than lessees and secured parties. An owner's
rights are far greater than the rights to possession and use held by
the lessee and, a fortiori, to the contingent claim to goods held by
the secured party. While an owner of goods must voluntarily relin-
quish ownership through contract or conduct before being deprived
conflicts arise between article 2 and article 9, the latter must yield to the competing
sales-related provision).
Courts also have difficulty distinguishing true bailments from secured transactions
where an owner of goods delivers them to a putative bailee who will either service the
goods or transform them. The cases are irreconcilable. Compare In re Sitkin Smelting &
Refining, Inc., 639 F.2d 1213 (5th Cir. 1981) (Fifth Circuit upheld the bankruptcy
court's finding of a bailment and thus Kodak could reclaim film from Sitkin after Sitkin's
bankruptcy, without being subject to the security interest of C.I.T., a secured financer of
Sitkin) with Kinetics Tech. Intern Corp. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 705 F.2d 397 (1983)
(Tenth Circuit rejected Kinetics' bailment theory, and accordingly found that a bank
with a secured financer's interest was secured by the goods).
209. See, e.g., T. BAIRD & D. JACKSON, supra note 208, at 740-42.
210. See Jackson & Peters, supra note 53, at 947.
211. Id.
212. In referring to the tests that the courts used to distinguish true leases from se-
cured transactions, the article 2A drafters said, "most of these criteria [sale and loan
factors] are as applicable to true leases as to security interests." U.C.C. § 1-201(37)
official comment (1987 proposed amendment).
213. From the Code's adoption in 1952 to the present, "sales" have been separated
from "secured transactions."
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of the goods,2 1 4 a secured party need not.2  At one extreme, gap-
filler provisions stand by to flesh out the sketchy accord reached in
the typical article 2 sale.21 6 At the other, article 9 is almost devoid
of such gap-filler provisions. A security agreement is thus more
likely to result from complex negotiations in which each party is
probably represented by counsel; a far cry from the ordinary sale
that may be initiated with an unsolicited purchase order sent
through the mail. 21 7 Indeed, while the bread-and-butter matter of
when default occurs under a security agreement must be spelled out
explicitly, the parties to a sales contract may not even broach the
fundamental issue of payment. 1 8
Even worse, with its unstated premise that unsecured sellers of
goods cannot trust their buyers, the prevailing view burdens the re-
lationship between the parties to the article 2 sale. Carried to its
logical conclusion, it requires that unsecured sellers involve bankers
to protect their financial stake to sold goods21 9 by insisting that their
cash buyers produce bank checks and that their credit buyers ar-
range for bank credit. The informal contract formation principles of
article 2 were, however, designed to promote sales without the in-
tervention of bankers. 2 Ordinary checks and open credit terms,
backed up by reclamation principles, are routine ways of paying for
goods. 22 If sales customarily were transacted with bankers, transac-
214. See supra note 101. See also Brodie Hotel Supply, Inc. v. United States, 431 F.2d
1316 (9th Cir. 1970) ("rights" to which security interest could attach arose from date of
actual sale, not earlier possession by buyer).
215. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-301 (citing the classes of persons who take priority over an
unperfected security interest).
216. See A. KRONMAN & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAw 4 (1979) (stat-
ing that many rules of contract law are "simply specifications of the consequences of
some contingency for which the contract makes no express provision").
217. Given its lineage, not surprisingly, the lease is somewhere in between. "The
lease is closer in spirit and form to the sale of goods than to the creation of a security
interest. While parties to a lease are sometimes represented by counsel and their agree-
ment is often reduced to writing. . . the drafting committee concluded that Article 2 was
the appropriate statutory analogue." U.C.C. § 2A-101 official comment.
218. See id. § 2-305 (open price term).
219. See McDonnell, The Floating Lienor as Good Faith Purchaser, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 429,
460 (1977): "[The Samuels] result allows a floating lienor to prevail over a cash seller
who has not been paid and who has no realistic means to protect his interests under the
Code." Id.
220. This is evident from the provisions allowing the seller to reserve a security inter-
est, § 2-401, the reclamation principles found in § 2-702, and the seller's remedies in
general under §§ 2-703 to -710.
221. "Millions of dollars worth of goods are sold each year on the strength of the
buyer's credit." R. NORDSTROM, supra note 43, § 165, at 498. See also D. EPSTEIN, T.
MARTIN, W. HENNING & S. NICKLES, BASIC UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 250 (3d ed.
1988) (most sales made on open credit). A security agreement is "a kind of agreement
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tion costs would increase-just as they would if unsecured cash or
credit sellers were required to give record notice.
The Code does not demand that its ownership claims be pub-
lished to protect them from creditors. 22 In fact, the argument that
lessors should be required to publish notice of their ownership
claims to protect them from secured parties was pressed during the
article 2A drafting process and rejected by the Code's sponsors.22 3
Merchants have sold goods for centuries without written contracts,
bankers, or record notice. The tradition was enthusiastically en-
dorsed for today by the Code's drafters.
CONCLUSION
The original Code did not embody the revolution in sales law
that its drafters envisioned. A massive dose of contract was not able
to ransom it from common-law title. The changes in chattel security
law, however, were fundamental. Myriad financing devices were dis-
mantled2 24 to give way to the all-encompassing article 9 "secured
transaction" whose core claim, the "security interest," was no
longer identical to ownership.
The intentions of Karl Llewellyn, the esteemed reporter for the
article 2 project, did not go unchallenged. As the Code project was
launched, another eminent scholar, Samuel Williston, warned that
the rejection of title, the most "fundamental feature" of the law of
property, would be disastrous.225
Someone must have been listening. Title principles are still
firmly in place, if not in sight, as the framework for today's com-
merce in goods.
that will not have remotely crossed [the seller and buyer's] minds." Jackson & Peters,
supra note 53, at 918.
222. Notice of a "sale on approval" need not be filed under § 2-326. Under this Code
bailment, "goods held on approval are not subject to the claims of the buyer's creditors
until acceptance." U.C.C. § 2-326(2). According to § 3-327(l)(a), "title" does not pass
to the buyer until then. Compare id. § 2-327(2) (title passes in "sale or return").
223. See id. § 2A-101 official comment.
224. See U.C.C. § 9-101 official comment.
225. Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV.
561, 569 (1950).
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